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A. AREA OF RESEARCH
Commerciality and commercial style competition are having a lasting impact and
influence on our Defense acquisition environment [Ref. 13: p. 3]. Commerciality
represents the use of commercial products and commercial buying practices. Rapid
technological change has expanded the potential for high-quality, high-performance, low-
cost commercial equipment to satisfy many military requirements [Ref. 13: p. 4]. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has recognized the need for innovative and cost-effective
commercial alternatives to offset the high costs of developing unique military systems.
A nondevelopmental item (NDI) acquisition represents a new pathway and philosophical
shift in the requirements process and material development [Ref. 15: p. 1-1]. It
challenges the traditional practice and cultural mindset of acquiring only unique
developmental items. The objective of an NDI acquisition is to minimize life-cycle costs
and avoid unnecessary developmental costs in acquiring suitable commercial alternatives
[Ref. 15: p. 2-11].
Our contracting philosophy has also shifted from awarding contracts on the basis
of lowest price to one of best value. The catalyst for this shift was the 1986 Packard
Commission, which recommended that DOD increase its use of commercial style
competition by emphasizing quality and established performance as well as price [Ref.
45: p. 62]. The Commission fostered the realization that awarding a contract solely on
the basis of lowest price creates a false economy, if there is subsequent default or
unsatisfactory performance [Ref. 20: 9.103(c)]. The key is to model industry's
competitive procurement techniques. In the past, the general rule has been to purchase
the Government's minimum needs and avoid "goldplating" [Ref. 11: p. vii]. Best-value
contracting gives the Government flexibility within reasonable bounds to select the
contractor who can best fulfill the needed requirements. Best-value contracting is a
departure from the traditional source selection process in that selection is not made based
upon minimum standards of acceptability, but rather on the basis of the offer that
demonstrates the highest probability of successful performance [Ref. 12: p. 6]. A best-
value strategy strikes a balance between achievable quality and cost realism [Ref. 35: p.
29].
Best value is not clearly defined in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) [Ref.
24: p. 3]. The goal is to find an equilibrium between the perceived value offered and
the price asked by either increasing the former or by reducing the latter. The concept
of best value has assumed several forms over the years [Ref. 39: p. 33]. The current
practice has manifested from the FAR Subpart 15.6 that describes the Government's
official policy on source selection in competitively negotiated procurements [Ref. 24: p.
3]. Two-step sealed bidding is not being fully utilized because of the proliferation and
success of best-value contracting. It is, however, a viable tool for acquiring
nondevelopmental items in a cost beneficial manner. Two-step has more flexibility than
one perceives. It also has many advantages to offer in comparison to a traditional source
selection process. Two-step is a very disciplined process that protects the Government
against poor quality while delivering acceptable products on-time and at the lowest
possible cost. It is important to realize that price-only awards are still valid for some
types of acquisitions. Budget realities have changed our acquisition focus towards
minimizing life-cycle costs [Ref. 23: p. 5]. Best value is still evolving and will likely
continue to do so, as our acquisition process continues to change [Ref. 43: p. 23].
A best-value decision is based on the overall or long-term worth to the Government
[Ref. 6: p. 17]. Two-step utilizes life-cycle costing. Two-step can balance price and
value in a manner that does not complicate the process by using life-cycle costing. Life-
cycle cost is a decision criterion that determines the total cost of ownership for acquiring
an end item. As a result, the criterion for contract award is no longer just price; it is
price plus a factor for operating and maintenance cost over the useful life of the product
[Ref. 40: p. 239]. Life-cycle cost is a measure of value or long-term worth [Ref. 5: p.
6]. It is a way to end "the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag only"
[Ref. 23: p. 53]. In the past, the Services tended to concentrate on the acquisition price
rather than the significance of ownership costs [Ref. 34: p. 118]. The Council of
Defense and Space Industries Association (CODSIA) indicated that lowest total cost or
life-cycle cost should be related to best value [Ref. 5: p. 6]. The logical conclusion to
deduce is that life-cycle cost is a form of best value.
The significance of this argument is to suggest that best value is not only suited for
competitively negotiated procurements but also two-step sealed bidding. The analytic
approach of this research is framed as a deductive argument to demonstrate that the
concept of best value can be applied to a two-step procurement method (Appendix G).
The objective of the research was to determine the feasibility of using two-step sealed
bidding for getting best value in NDI acquisitions. The value anticipated from this
research is to show DOD that best-value and two-step procurements are not mutually
exclusive, and that two-step is a viable procurement method for expanding the role of
best value and NDI acquisitions.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research was to examine the feasibility of using two-step
sealed bidding for getting best value in NDI procurements. The underlying goal was to
form a union between two-step and best-value procurements. The focus was not to create
a perfect match, but rather to fashion a two-step method that could embrace the concept
of best value. As a result, a two-step process can be considered a de facto best value
source selection.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
1. Primary Research Question
To what extent can the Department of Defense use two-step sealed bidding
for getting best value in nondevelopmental items?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
• What are the essential characteristics of best-value contracting?
• What is a nondevelopmental item acquisition?
• What features of the two-step process are inherently best-value characteristics?
• What are the key impediments in two-step sealed bidding that preclude the use of
best value?
• How can a two-step method be improved in order to facilitate its joint use with best
value and NDI procurements?
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
This research explored the feasibility of using two-step sealed bidding for getting
best value in NDI acquisitions. The initial research presented a comprehensive look at
nondevelopmental item acquisition, two-step sealed bidding, and best-value contracting.
The research then demonstrated how the concept of best value can be applied to a two-
step method. Finally, this study described an alternative best-value approach that
integrated the best-value concept into two-step sealed bidding.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The overall research strategy was an archival-based method. For this research,
primary sources included DOD official documents and personal interviews, while
secondary sources were publications or materials gathered by other investigators. The
following sources were used in the literature review search:
• Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
• Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)
• Federal Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE)
• Air University Periodical Index
• DOD Component Procurement and Policy Divisions
A Venn Diagram conceptually outlined the research design (Appendix G). This model
framed the analytic approach and provided the basis for the archival research
methodology. In addition, the researcher interviewed a small but representative sampling
of top-down procurement officials in both DOD and industry. The interview results and
the data collected helped to support the cumulative results of the study.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remainder of the thesis is organized into the following chapters:
Chapter II, "Theoretical Framework," highlights the general background of
nondevelopmental item acquisition, two-step sealed bidding, and best-value contracting.
Chapter III, "A Compendium of Interview Responses," presents a compilation of
data collected and compendium of interview responses.
Chapter IV, "An Analysis of Critical Issues," analyzes the major problems or
issues that have resulted from the interviews and materials previously researched. It also
describes how the concept of best value can be applied to a two-step procurement
method.
Chapter V, "An Alternative Best-Value Approach," describes a two-step approach
for getting best value in NDI acquisitions.
Chapter VI, "Conclusions and Recommendations," summarizes the overall
conclusions and recommendations of this study.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter II provides the general background for this study. This chapter explores
three important areas: (1) nondevelopmental item acquisition, (2) two-step sealed
bidding, and (3) best-value contracting. NDI acquisitions are forging a new path in the
traditional requirements and material development processes. Nondevelopmental items
can be innovative and cost-effective "alternatives" to reduce both time and costs while
improving product quality [Ref. 16: p. 10-C-l]. A nondevelopmental item acquisition
tries to minimize life-cycle costs and avoid unnecessary developmental costs [Ref. 15:
p. 5-4].
Two-step sealed bidding is a combination of competitive procedures designed to
obtain the benefits of sealed bidding when adequate specifications are not available [Ref.
20: 14.501], It is a modified type of sealed bidding. A two-step process can be a viable
and dynamic approach to acquire NDI products when using life-cycle costing, bid
samples, and quality-related evaluation factors. In the past, the general rule has been to
purchase the Government's minimum needs and avoid "goldplating" [Ref. 11: p. vii].
Today, our contracting philosophy has shifted from "lowest price" to a contractor's
performance in producing quality products. Best-value contracting enables the
Government to receive "increased value" by placing greater emphasis on contractor
performance in both quality and on-time delivery [Ref. 7: p. 5]. Best value capitalizes
on commercial style competition. As defense procurement dollars continue to shrink,
best-value NDI procurements can better serve the Department of Defense's goals.
B. NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM ACQUISITION
1. General
What is NDI? Nondevelopmental item is a broad, generic term that covers
material available from a wide variety of sources with little or no development effort
required by the Government [Ref. 15: p. 1-3]. Typically, nondevelopmental items are
those already developed and capable of fulfilling operational requirements either "as is"
or with "minor modification." The purpose of acquiring NDIs is to minimize or
eliminate the need for costly, time-consuming, Government-sponsored research and
development programs [Ref. 15: p. 1-1]. Title 10 (Section 2325) of the United States
Code codifies the meaning of nondevelopmental item (Appendix A). The statute includes
any item available in the commercial marketplace. The NDI definition also includes any
item already developed and in use by the Services or other Governmental Agencies, and
foreign governments with which the United States (U.S.) has a cooperative agreement.
The NDI Statute further mandates the "preferential" use of nondevelopmental
items to satisfy requirements to the maximum extent practicable (Appendix A). As
mentioned, an NDI covers a spectrum of material alternatives (Appendix B). NDI
represents an entire umbrella of commercially available products at little or no
developmental cost to the Government [Ref. 30: p. 14]. A nondevelopmental item
acquisition is influenced by commercialization. That is, rapidly changing commercial
technologies have expanded the potential for high quality and low cost commercial items
to satisfy many military requirements [Ref. 13: p. 4]. Although NDI is clearly defined
by law, there is still much ambiguity regarding the meaning of NDI within the
Department of Defense. The interpretation of what is meant by commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) is an example. COTS and NDI are not synonymous. COTS is only one
category (subset) of what DOD considers NDI [Ref. 15: p. 1-3]. Overall, NDI means
products that can be purchased off-the-shelf or slightly modified, and that are built to
commercial or military standards to best meet the military's requirements [Ref. 14: p.
34].
2. Origin and Background
In 1972, the Commission on Government Procurement first emphasized the
need for a shift in fundamental philosophy toward commercial product acquisition [Ref.
15: p. 1-1]. In 1976, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) directed that
"Agencies shall purchase commercial products ... whenever such products ... adequately
satisfy the Government's needs" [Ref. 6: p. 7]. In June of 1986, the President's Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) recommended that
the Government make greater use of commercial components, systems, and services
available "off-the-shelf." Specifically, the Packard Commission recommended:
Rather that relying on excessively rigid military specifications, DOD should make
greater use of components, systems, and services available "off-the-shelf." It
should develop new or custom-made items only when it has been established that
those readily available are clearly inadequate to meet military requirements [Ref.
5: p. 60].
The 1987 Preference Act required DOD to state material requirements in
terms of functions to be performed, performance required, and essential physical
characteristics [Ref. 15: p. 1-2]. This Act established the preference for non-
developmental items to the maximum extent practicable. The Preference Act was
designed to change the "cultural mindset" of DOD. Availability of commercial
alternatives is not the problem; the problem is increasing the demand for such products.
On 16 May 1989, the Committee on Government Affairs stressed the need
for DOD to expand the use of commercially available items and minimize research and
development costs. The Committee's concern was:
Too often, the Department of Defense continues to subject commercially available
parts to complex military specifications and, as such, requires contractors to
reinvent a unique military specification wheel when a commercially available wheel
can perform the task just as well [Ref. 9: p. 1].
Finally, the 1991 Defense Authorization Act required DOD to conduct market research
prior to developing new specifications to determine if nondevelopmental items are
available to meet the identified need [Ref. 14: p. 4]. The legislative history indicates the
various measures implemented to stimulate the use of an NDI as a viable alternative
instead of developing a unique military product.
3. Utility
NDI can serve a critical role in today's world of Government procurement.
A nondevelopmental item acquisition challenges the traditional approach of relying upon
uniquely developmental efforts. NDI capitalizes on the use of commercial "state-of-the-
art" technologies while providing DOD with effective and economical solutions to its
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essential operational requirements. As the pressures for change continue, this
nontraditional (NDI) approach will likewise improve.
Nondevelopmental items can apply to a whole spectrum of items ranging from
simple consumable products to complex-integrated weapon systems. NDI acquisitions
involve both large and small procurements. There are endless opportunities to reduce
cost and improve quality through increased use of NDI [Ref. 15: p. 2-1]. The
incremental benefits of an NDI acquisition diminish as the item moves away from pure
"off-the-shelf" to full development (Appendix B). To provide further clarification, a pure
"off-the-shelf" product is used in the same environment for which it is designed. A
ruggedized or militarized item normally operates in a different environment than its
original design. Typically, some developmental effort is required. Finally,
developmental items with NDI components or subsystems often require substantial
research and development efforts to accomplish systems integration [Ref. 29: p. 4].
What are some examples of NDI acquisitions? The Army's acquisition of the
Beretta 9mm pistol is an example of an "off-the-shelf" item. The Air Force's purchase
of the KC-10 aircraft is a "ruggedization" item. An example of subsystem and
component integration is the Army's Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE). A major
defense acquisition that is nondevelopmental is the Army's Palletized Loading System
(PLS). The predominant use of NDI is related to the insertion of NDI at subsystem,
component, and piece part levels in major developmental efforts [Ref. 15: p. 2-3].
There are many commercial market areas that are well suited for nondevelopmental item
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acquisitions: computers, power generation, test measurement equipment, transportation
and communications equipment, and navigational equipment [Ref. 13: p. 15].
What are the main benefits and risks associated with an NDI acquisition?
One major benefit is that it offers quick response to operational needs. In general, NDI
acquisitions have shorter acquisition cycles. The NDI acquisition cycle takes 2 to 5 years
versus the classical research and development cycle of 8 to 16 years [Ref. 6: p. 7].
There may also be reduced testing requirements because the commercial manufacturer's
test and performance data can be used to prove military suitability. NDI acquisitions
tend to cost less. Furthermore, experience with nondevelopmental items has shown that
quality tends to be as good if not better than specially developed items when they are
properly purchased to meet a military need [Ref. 14: p. 5].
There are potential risks and drawbacks with an NDI acquisition. A major
problem is configuration control and obsolescence (inherent with rapidly changing
technologies) which results in sustainability problems [Ref. 29: p. 5]. A further problem
is technology insertion. The difficulty is managing and controlling the process of
capturing NDI product configuration information, which often lags behind and falls
victim to obsolescence. Faulty or inadequate market research may result in failure of
the product to meet essential performance or logistics support requirements. The market
survey establishes only that the material alternative is "good enough", not necessarily the
best product [Ref. 8: p. 10]. Finally, as more and larger modifications are required, the
intended benefits may rapidly disappear and the cost savings are lost [Ref. 14: p. 4].
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4. Important Features and Procedures
Flexibility and innovation are critical aspects of the requirements
determination process [Ref. 15: p. 1-5]. NDI acquisitions require individualized and
tailored requirements to best meet the acquisition needs. The Government's requirements
should be stated in functional or performance terms instead of "how to" design
specifications [Ref. 16: p. 6-L-2]. An accurate and detailed "market analysis" is
essential to analyze properly the full spectrum of commercial products available [Ref 14:
p. 5]. A careful "trade-off analysis" is needed to determine if a commercial alternative
can meet essential operational and support requirements. Carefully developed acquisition
and support strategies are imperative in the acquisition planning and decision making
process [Ref. 29: p. 2], In determining the viability of specific alternatives, the
nondevelopmental item should not be assessed solely on the basis of performance but in
the context of "total system effectiveness parameters" [Ref. 15: p. 2-5].
The NDI acquisition process is not a separate process, but a tailoring of
processes and events within the traditional material acquisition process. NDI acquisitions
allow for flexibility in the acquisition management and control of program milestones.
For example, a nondevelopmental item might meet all the operational requirements with
no modification that may allow for a single milestone decision review (I/III) to verify
suitability and initiate production [Ref. 15: p. 2-2]. Another important feature is test and
evaluation. Test and evaluation should be kept to a minimum. Any modifications should
include additional test plans to ensure performance and operational success of the
modification effort [Ref. 16: p. 6-L-3]. Logistics support is another significant aspect.
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Supportability is a major factor in the decision to buy a nondevelopmental item [Ref. 16:
p. 6-L-3]. Support planning and execution is not as time responsive as equipment
procurement [Ref. 15: p. 2-10]. The entire process of planning for and acquiring
logistics support must be tailored to the constraints inherent in the nondevelopmental item
being supported [Ref. 29: p. 14]. Consideration should be given to maximize the use of
existing commercial logistics support and data [Ref. 16: p. 6-L-3].
Commercial practices should be encouraged when purchasing
nondevelopmental items. NDI acquisition efforts are inherently geared to selecting
products based on many factors including price. The concept of "best value" should be
incorporated into the source selection process [Ref. 15: p. 2-1]. The intent is to get the
greatest overall value for the Government in terms of performance and other factors.
Life-cycle cost is as important in NDI decisions as it is in all other acquisitions. As an
example, some nondevelopmental items could be selected that have the lowest projected
life-cycle costs and meet essential requirements [Ref. 15: p. 2-5]. In other cases, other
price-related factors may predominate.
5. Underlying Theoretical Importance
A successful NDI acquisition demands a philosophical shift in requirements
planning and material development [Ref. 15: p. 1-1]. It challenges the traditional
practice and cultural mindset of buying and developing only unique military items. The
intent is to provide time and cost savings. NDI acquisitions allow for greater flexibility
in the requirements process. In the past, the rigid use of military standards and
specifications restricted the acquisition process and fostered a Defense bias in favor of
14
only unique developmental efforts [Ref. 45: p. 60]. The Department of Defense can no
longer afford the high costs associated with rigid design specifications. The rapidly
changing technologies in the commercial marketplace enable high quality commercial
products to satisfy many user requirements in DOD.
NDI is a category of materiel acquisition strategies that has mandated
preference. A nondevelopmental item acquisition is not meant to be a separate process
but only a flexible variation to enhance the Government's ability to purchase
commercially available products. Considering the hierarchy of material alternatives, an
NDI acquisition is a viable approach [Ref. 14: p. 4]. As a concept, it correlates to the
movement of "commerciality" that is affecting the status quo in the acquisition
environment. NDI has opened the door to a wide range of commercial alternatives to
best meet the Government's needs.
C. TWO-STEP SEALED BIDDING
1. General
Two-step sealed bidding is a combination of competitive procedures designed
to obtain the benefits of sealed bidding when adequate specifications are not available
[Ref. 20: 14.501]. It is a modified type of sealed bidding. The objective of the two-step
method is to permit the development of a sufficiently descriptive specification that is not
an unduly restrictive statement of the Government's requirements. A specification means
a description of the technical requirements for an item that includes the criteria for
determining whether these requirements are met. Specifications shall state only the
15
Government's actual minimum needs and be designed to promote full and open
competition [Ref. 20: 10.001].
As implied by its name, two-step sealed bidding has two distinct steps. Step
one focuses on determining the acceptability of the product or item and is accomplished
through the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if necessary) discussion of a
technical proposal. Essentially, the first step consists of the solicitation and evaluation
of technical offers (unpriced). The word, technical, is broadly defined to include, among
other things, the engineering approach, special manufacturing processes, and special
testing techniques [Ref. 20: 14.501(a)]. In this step, the technical evaluation is based on
conformity to the requirements. It is not a responsibility determination.
The first step is an evaluation process whereby the sources are prequalified
for participation in the second step. Step one is a qualifying and not a competitive phase.
It identifies and determines engineering and technical competence "acceptable" for
producing the item [Ref. 19: p. 252]. Step two involves the submission of priced bids
by those who submitted "acceptable" technical proposals in step one. Bids submitted in
step two are evaluated, and the award is made in accordance with the procedures
prescribed for conventional sealed bidding [Ref. 20: 14.501(b)]. An award is made to
the responsive, responsible bidder whose bid is most advantageous to the Government
considering only price and the price-related factors included in the invitation [Ref. 20:
14.103.2(a)]. Identification of offerors whose technical proposals are determined to be
acceptable is a critical element of the methodology. This helps to ensure that the
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Government has qualified contractors capable of providing the product desired [Ref. 41:
p. II-9].
2. Origin and Background
Prior to World War II, sealed bidding (formal advertising) was the primary
method of procurement. After World War II, the President requested that Congress
study the procurement situation and develop a procurement method that would assure
maximum efficiency for the Federal Government both in terms of price and timely
delivery [Ref. 41: p. 1-2]. The congressional bill enacted was the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 (ASPA). This Act was codified in Title 10 of the United States
Code [Ref. 41: p. 1-3]. This Procurement Act authorized two procurement methods:
formal advertising (sealed bidding) and negotiations. Furthermore, this Act stipulated
that formal advertising was the preferred method of use [Ref. 41: p. 1-3].
After the enactment of the ASPA (1947), Government acquisition personnel
found that a class of procurement actions met most of the requirements for sealed
bidding, but lacked sufficient detail, in specifications, to be awarded without negotiations
concerning the technical requirements of the contract [Ref. 41: p. 1-4]. In 1957, a
special investigation subcommittee report to the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) made recommendations that led to the establishment of a hybrid acquisition
method called two-step formal advertising [Ref. 25: p. 5]. The two-step method was
actually developed by the U.S. Air Force [Ref. 41: p. 1-4].
Two-step sealed bidding is a method of procurement, which is designed to
expand the use and obtain the benefits of sealed bidding where it is otherwise impractical
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to do so because of inadequate specifications or design [Ref. 59: p. 34]. From 1960 to
1984, two-step sealed bidding had limited success in relation to conventional sealed
bidding [Ref. 41: p. 1-4]. In 1984, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) or Public
Law 98-369 was passed by Congress. This Statute eliminated the requirement to use
sealed bidding as the preferred method of acquisition. CICA gave Agencies the
flexibility to determine which competitive procurement method best fit the circumstances
of the acquisition [Ref. 41: p. 1-5]. CICA placed sealed bidding and competitive
proposals (negotiations) on equal terms.
3. Function
Two-step sealed bidding is not suited for all military procurements. Two-step
may be used instead of negotiations when available specifications are not definite or may
be too restrictive. There are other conditions for use to consider [Ref. 20: 14: 502(a)].
A two-step method is especially useful in acquisitions requiring technical proposals for
relatively complex items [Ref. 20: 14.501], It is also a common procurement method
for acquiring nondevelopmental items [Ref. 15: p. 5-4]. It is uniquely suited for high-
dollar production contracts in which the item is not too technically sophisticated [Ref. 41:
p. B-4]. This method is best suited for those nondevelopmental items that are "off-the-
shelf and those requiring "minor modification" [Ref. 15: p. 5-4]. The Army's 120mm
Mortar System was procured as a nondevelopmental item using two-step. In the past,
the Army and Air Force have been the primary users of this method [Ref. 28: p. 4].
The largest commodity areas are electronics and communication equipment and non-
combat vehicles. Two-step has been around for more than 20 years. Even though two-
18
step has received a very small percentage of use, it is a procurement method that has
more promise than realized [Ref. 41: p. IV-2].
4. Advantages and Disadvantages
What are some of the benefits of using a two-step methodology? There is a
broader base upon which industry can compete. In other words, two-step sealed bidding
encourages competition because contractors are not bound to the rigidity of design
specifications [Ref. 41: p. III-2]. Importantly, the contractor has greater flexibility to
submit alternative approaches to satisfy the technical requirements. Also, the
Government, in step one, has the capability to take advantage of an industry's experience
without costly use of research and development contracts [Ref. 41: p. III-2]. Finally,
the use of performance specifications enables the Government to maximize its
effectiveness in purchasing nondevelopmental items.
Next, let's consider some of the major disadvantages. Two-step sealed
bidding is generally considered costly and time consuming [Ref. 41: p. IV-2]. Also, a
two-step process may result in the procurement of an item, which is not the best in terms
of quality. This can occur because the contract award is based on the lowest priced
offeror that satisfies the minimum requirements. Another aspect to consider is bid
protests that frequently occur due to the latitude afforded to contracting offices in
determining "technical acceptability" [Ref. 41: p. III-2]. Step one is based on technical
acceptability not technical superiority. Finally, a two-step method is limited to price
competition and not technical competition. The low-bid (price) basis makes it almost
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impossible to reward or take advantage of proposals with design features exceeding the
minimum specified requirements.
5. Key Characteristics
What are the critical aspects of two-step sealed bidding? The first element
is the technical evaluation process. The technical evaluation of the proposals is based
upon the criteria outlined in the request for technical proposals (RTP). There is a degree
of flexibility afforded in determining whether or not a technical proposal is acceptable.
The decision is a matter requiring judgment and expertise by technically qualified
personnel [Ref. 59: p. 20]. It is not a consideration of responsibility. Proposals are
placed within one of three categories: acceptable, reasonably susceptible of being made
acceptable, and unacceptable [Ref. 20: 14.503- 1(e)]. The Government is not required
to initiate efforts to clarify a proposal that is materially deficient.
"Technical acceptability" is based on conformity to the technical requirements
contained in the solicitation. The determination of acceptability is predicated on precisely
tailored and relevant evaluation factors (excluding price). The evaluation factors must
relate to the broad meaning of the word "technical" as well as to conformity. The word
"technical" connotates such things as engineering approach, special manufacturing
processes, and special testing techniques. Conformity, on the other hand, relates to
quality. Quality can be defined as "conformance to correctly defined requirements and
satisfying customer needs" [Ref. 34: p. 24]. In this context, acceptability relates to both
technical and quality considerations. Quality also means the composite of material
attributes including performance features and other product characteristics to satisfy a
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given need [Ref. 10: 246.101]. Typical factors that should be considered are:
reliability, safety, interchangeability, and maintainability [Ref. 10: 246.103]. The key
is to be creative and innovative in conducting the evaluation process.
Another important aspect of two-step sealed bidding is "price-related" factors. The
exclusion of pricing data eliminates the possibility of price being considered as an
evaluation factor in the first step. Price exclusion allows for conventional sealed bidding
to occur in step two. The key, however, is to focus on "price-related factors." The
basis for award considers only price and price-related factors [Ref. 20: 14. 103.2]. Price-
related factors are often not maximized. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
suggests that factors such as inspection and transportation costs may be considered in
evaluating bids for award; however, these factors are not "inclusive" [Ref. 20: 14.201-8].
Section M of the solicitation document enables the Government to specify price-related
factors other than the bid price that will be considered in evaluating bids for contract
award. Two examples are extended warranties and life-cycle cost (LCC).
Let's consider life-cycle costing. If contained in the solicitation, the Government
can use life-cycle cost as the decision criterion for determining the lowest priced offeror.
In other words, a bidder is required to specify a computed total life-cycle cost, rather
than price for the award determination [Ref. 40: p. 254]. This technique is suitable for
many different products from nonrepairable end items like batteries to complex items like
the current Army and Air Force's Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System
Receiver (PLGR) procurement. Life-cycle cost can be defined as determining the total
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cost to the Government including operations and maintenance over the expected life of
the product offered [Ref. 7: p. 17].
The concept underlying this approach is to encourage more cost effective
products to be offered. The technique asks for a guarantee that total cost of ownership
will be at the expected level [Ref. 40: p. 255]. The appeal of this model is that:
A superior product that takes advantage of the latest technology may be acquired
without the need for the Government to develop its own specifications to define the
latest, best and most cost-effective end product [Ref. 40: p. 255].
When using LCC as a price-related factor, the Government seeks to award the
procurement on the basis of the total cost of ownership for the acquired end item. The
criterion for contract award is no longer just price. Instead, it is price plus a factor for
operating and maintenance cost over the useful life of the product [Ref. 40: p. 239].
Let's consider the following example to better understand this. Not all
products are quantifiable. A good example is the procurement of a commercial test
measurement device, such as a multimeter or oscilloscope. Given the nature of the
commercial product, the following cost elements could be considered to compute the
projected LCC:
1. Hardware cost (maximum quantities).
2. Cost of initial contractor training.
3. Cost of technical data requirements.
4. Cost of spare parts (type and quantities).
5. Cost of maintenance and calibration fixtures and accessories.
6. Cost of interim contractor maintenance and calibration support.
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7. Life-cycle cost of Government maintenance and calibration [Ref. 36: p. 22].
Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR) and Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) can also be
used. The difficult part of this model is to find features that are quantifiable and
measurable. Interestingly, an offeror can benefit from having additional features in the
product under life-cycle costing. It is possible that additional features could improve
MTBF statistics, which may then benefit the offeror by lowering the overall bid price in
the life-cycle cost evaluation [Ref. 36: p. 12]. In such cases, the contractor has an
incentive not to remove additional features that exceed the minimum needs.
Finally, the last important feature is bid sample testing. Two-step sealed bidding
can use bid sample testing. A bid sample is furnished by a bidder to show the
characteristics of the product offered in a bid [Ref. 20: 14.202-4]. Bid samples are
appropriate when characteristics of the product cannot be adequately described in the
specification. Many product characteristics are difficult to describe, including balance,
facility of use, general feel, or pattern. Bid samples can be used in step one. Bid
samples are then evaluated for conformance to the performance requirements specified
in the solicitation. The evaluation will be on a "pass/ fail" basis. Bid samples will be
used only to determine the "responsiveness of the bid" and not used to determine a
bidder's ability to produce the required item. Bids will be rejected as nonresponsive if
the sample fails to conform to each of the characteristics listed in the invitation. Bid
samples strengthen a two-step method because they offer a physical demonstration of the
product and explicitly reduce overall risk.
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6. Relational Importance
Two-step sealed bidding is a viable alternative for acquiring
nondevelopmental items. Two-step can be a dynamic process when it uses life-cycle
costing, quality factors, and bid samples. Life-cycle costing goes beyond the acquisition
sticker price. It is a price-related factor that includes all the operation and maintenance
expenses up through and including its disposal. The Services have tended to concentrate
on the acquisition price instead of the significance of ownership costs [Ref. 34: p. 118].
Life-cycle cost is a measure of long-term worth [Ref. 5: p. 6]. A best-value decision is
based on long-term worth [Ref. 7: p. 17]. Quality is an inherent aspect of a two-step
process. Two-step has the flexibility to incorporate quality factors, such as reliability,
into the evaluation process. As mentioned, bid samples also strengthen a two-step
process because they offer a physical demonstration of the product. Together, a two-step
method can result in a product that is most beneficial to the Government in terms of
achieving greater long-term worth.
D. BEST-VALUE CONTRACTING
1. General
What is best-value contracting? Best-value contracting is a source selection
process that gives the Government flexibility within reasonable bounds to select the
contractor who can best fulfill the needed requirements. Best value has no explicit
statutory or regulatory definition [Ref. 32: p. 45]. In general, it refers to a source
selection where the award decision is based upon a tradeoff between the price offered and
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other factors of the proposal such as quality or technical. This tradeoff assessment
resembles a cost/benefit analysis. A value judgment must be made to determine whether
the price differences between competing proposals are justified by their other aspects
[Ref. 32: p. 45]. Best-value contracting is the cornerstone and focus of competitively
negotiated procurements.
Let's consider the following definitions to best capture the essence of best-
value contracting. The following definitions outline the fundamental elements of best-
value contracting:
• A source selection decision based on a comparative assessment of price and other
evaluation factors. These factors may include, but are not limited to, a contractor's
quality history and timeliness of delivery [Ref. 11: p. 1-4].
• When the basis for award states that factors other than cost/price (such as technical
merit, past performance, and management capabilities) will be considered in order
to determine which proposal has the best promise of meeting the Government's
needs [Ref. 21: p. 1].
The objective of best value is to select the proposal that is most advantageous to the
Government considering price and non-price factors [Ref. 57: p. 29]. Best value is a
source selection evaluation process where all relevant factors, not just price, are taken
into account prior to making a procurement decision. There are numerous interpretations
of what is meant by best-value contracting (Appendix C). Best value does not
necessarily mean lowest price. A best-value procurement allows the Government the
discretion to determine that a proposal which may not be the lowest price among
competing proposals may still be the "best value" because advantageous aspects of the
proposal are considered to be worth the extra money [Ref. 21: p.l].
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Best-value contracting contrasts directly with sealed bidding in which contract
award is based on lowest priced, acceptable offeror. Under sealed bidding, price is the
sole determinant, which excludes price and performance tradeoff considerations. There
is little incentive for a contractor to be innovative or exceed the minimum standards.
The best (greatest) value concept is cited in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
that states:
While the lowest price or lowest total cost to the Government is properly the
deciding factor in many source selections, in certain acquisitions, the Government
may select the source whose proposal offers the greatest value to the Government
in terms of performance and other factors [Ref. 20: 15.605(c)].
Best value is a source selection process in which the award basis considers factors other
than price.
2. Origin and Background
Best value is a spin-off of the classical commercial buying objective: "to buy
products of the right quality, in the right quantity, at the right price, from the right
sources and at the right time" [Ref. 35: p. 25]. No one likes to feel that they have been
"ripped off when they make a purchase. Regardless of whether the purchaser is an
individual, a company, or the Federal Government, all buyers seek to obtain value for
their purchase dollar. The decision on how to purchase is a combination of the steps
taken to make the purchase decision, and perception that determines whether or not the
buyer has obtained value for the dollar [Ref. 49: p. 1]. Furthermore, best value comes
from the realization that the award of a contract based solely on the lowest price can
create a false economy if there is subsequent default, late deliveries, or unsatisfactory
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performance that results in greater overall costs to the Government [Ref. 20: 9.103(c)].
Best value selects the source whose proposal offers the greatest likelihood for successful
performance.
The Packard Commission served as the catalyst for this fundamental shift in
contracting philosophy. The Commission recommended that DOD increase its use of
commercial style competition by emphasizing quality and established performance as well
as price [Ref. 45: p. 62]. The key is to focus on achieving a more "effective
competition" by modeling industry's competitive procurement techniques. The
Commission also found that contractors have the flexibility needed to choose the best
overall (most qualified) vendor to perform the contract. Furthermore, the Packard
Commission clarified the intent of the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). A
belief persisted that CICA required the Government to buy from the lowest bidder, and
that it precluded the use of qualification or evaluation criteria [Ref. 43: p. 20].
Actually, CICA made it easier to use competitive proposal because it was put on an equal
basis with sealed bidding. DOD could also use whatever relevant factors it wanted to
determine the winning proposal under competing (negotiated) contracts [Ref. 45: p. 66].
As W. Edwards Deming states, "price has no meaning without a measure of
the quality being purchased" [Ref. 34: p. 17]. This is the underlying motivation behind
the concept of best value. Under best-value contracting, the contractor recognizes that
something more than price will go into the source selection. There is an incentive
provided for delivering a better product even at a higher price [Ref. 37: p. 55]. Best
value is in effect a "total buying decision" concept and the best decision for the
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Government. The Packard Commission saw no real difference from what the average
consumer considers in making purchasing decisions. American consumers make value
judgments (tradeoffs) among a wide range of similarly capable products. However, there
are variations in prices as well as selected features and differences in perceived quality.
Ultimately, whether or not the additional features are worth the extra cost depends upon
the needs and circumstances of the consumer [Ref. 11: p. vii]. Best value is an
"affordable excellence" strategy. It is a value-based approach that seeks to achieve a
balance between achievable quality and cost realism [Ref. 35: p. 29]. Best value is a
"total quality buying decision."
3. Salient Features
Best value represents the most advantageous procurement decision available
to the Government. Best value is a source selection process. A best-value procurement
includes the following elements:
• Comprehensive requirements definition
• Clear, relevant evaluation factors
• Disciplined evaluation process
• Decision based on the most advantageous acquisition cost [Ref. 49: p. 1].
These features provide a framework for best-value contracting. The first element centers
on the requirements process. All significant requirements must be spelled out and
specified in the solicitation so that each contractor (player) understands the rules and
participates on an equal playing field. The technical and operational requirements should
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be expressed in functional terms. This promotes a wider range of possible solutions.
The Government should send out a draft request for proposal (RFP). Draft RFPs are
invaluable tools to ensure comprehensive and well defined requirements. Since best-
value contracting is highly subjective, it is critical to get early industry involvement for
the process to be successful [Ref. 43: p. 22].
The second aspect is clear and relevant evaluation criteria. The evaluation
criteria are the backbone of the source selection process. Evaluation factors are
evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively to arrive at an integrated assessment as to which
proposal can best meet the Government's needs [Ref. 16: p. 10-B-4]. The relative
importance of the factors must be indicated in the solicitation. Excessive subdivision of
factors should be avoided to preclude an unnecessarily detailed assessment that obscures
significant differences among proposals [Ref. 16: p. 10-B-4]. Adherence and consistency
are critical to protect the integrity of the process. There is no prescribed methodology
for rating or scoring. Past practices include color coding, numerical, and adjectival
rating. The key is to specify the scoring system up-front in the solicitation and
consistently apply it. Evaluation criteria are uniquely tailored to each procurement.
Typical criteria may include price, quality, reliability, maintainability, past performance,
technical superiority, and any other relevant factor. Properly identifying the evaluation
criteria increases the probability of evaluating and selecting the most advantageous
contractor [Ref. 4: p. 53].
The third area is a disciplined evaluation process. The integrity of the
evaluation process is paramount. Inconsistent practices make this highly discretionary
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process vulnerable to litigation. Improper identification and inconsistent use of
evaluation factors are common problems. A study found that inappropriate factors
resulted in a greater probability of error and provided an open invitation to protests by
contractors [Ref. 4: p. 54]. No two procurements are the same. Each specific
solicitation undoubtedly weights the specific evaluation factors differently. The critical
aspect of this process is to ensure that the weighted factors are consistently applied
throughout the proposal evaluation or source selection. Each proposal must be evaluated
and assessed with a coherent and auditable record established [Ref. 49: p. 6]. Best-value
contracting must have a "thought process consistent with guidance."
The last component is to have a decision based on the most advantageous
acquisition cost [Ref. 49: p. 7]. A best-value procurement attempts to capture greater
value while considering other factors and price. The selection decision is based on
lowest overall cost instead of contract price [Ref. 49: p. 7]. The decision should include
performance considerations beyond the immediate hardware end item such as reliability
and compatibility. The value or worth to the Government must be based on
consideration of the resource investment needed to fulfill the requirement. The
Government must strike a balance between performance parameters and cost realism
[Ref. 35: p. 29]. In effect, the Government must ensure a realistic cost/benefit analysis
is done. For example, a high price is offset by an increase in overall value to the
Government. The "worth" is the judgment exercised by the Government [Ref. 51: p. 5].
The Government is accepting the fact that it may have to pay more if it can be assured
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that the risk factor is at its lowest. Best value selects the source that best meets the
criterion of providing optimum satisfaction of mission needs.
4. Relationship To Source Selection
Let's consider how best-value contracting relates to source selection. Best
value is a departure from the traditional source selection process in that selection is not
made based upon minimum standards of acceptability, but rather on the basis of the offer
which demonstrates the highest probability of successful performance at a reasonable,
realistic price [Ref. 12: p. 6]. Best value gives the Government greater flexibility to
consider price and performance tradeoffs to determine the best overall value or source.
Best value like source selection seeks to select the proposal, which offers the greatest
promise of meeting identified needs. It is a relative assessment of risk [Ref. 48: p. 4-4].
Best value can be considered a modified or streamlined version of formal
source selection [Ref. 4: p. 14]. The Services have implemented many different best-
value programs. In many of these programs, the major evaluation factor is past
performance. The importance of past performance is to assess the probability of
successful accomplishment of the proposed effort [Ref. 16: p. 10-B-6]. In other words,
the purpose of measuring a contractor's past performance is to determine whether or not
a contractor will do the job successfully, rather than can the contractor do the job. The
latter is a responsibility determination. Responsibility determinations are limited to
determining whether or not an offeror has the capability to perform (go/no-go decision)
and can meet the minimum standards of acceptability. The ability to assess risk is
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greatly reduced. This difference is critical because best value is a relative assessment
of risk [Ref. 4: p. 30].
Let's first look at those programs that focus on measuring a contractor's past
performance. These best-value programs are called "source pre-qualification" programs
such as Blue Ribbon, Quality Vendor, and Red-Yellow-Green. The attempt is to get
better quality and performance by qualifying (validating) vendors for special
consideration [Ref. 7: p. 5]. This method allows for the payment of a higher price to
contractors who have a history of superior performance. A firm's past performance is
measured by quality and on-time delivery. Such programs allow for price flexibility
(ceiling percentage) above the lowest price. In return, the Government obtains a greater
expectation of higher quality and on-time performance. Price and past performance are
the two primary evaluation factors. These programs are best suited when the
Government finds persistent quality problems on past contracts, or when a strict delivery
schedule is more important. Furthermore, this variation does not replace a determination
of responsibility, but adds a form of risk assessment to the evaluation process [Ref. 55:
p. 2]. Finally, this model or variation helps the Government to end the practice of
awarding business on the basis of price tag only by considering the total cost of a
procurement when the cost of poor quality is added to the source selection formula [Ref.
23: p. 53].
As mentioned earlier, best value can be considered a formal source selection
method. The process is more extensive and focuses on evaluating all relevant non-price
factors in addition to price to determine which contractor will best perform the contract
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[Ref. 12: p. 6]. The determination of which factors to use is the cornerstone of a best
value source selection. There is an enhanced model used by the Air Force and Army.
The product is a "performance risk assessment. " The Performance Risk Analysis Group
(PRAG) conducts this assessment. Performance risk is a confidence measure that
assesses an offeror's past contract work records to determine the offeror's ability to
perform the solicitation requirements [Ref. 18: p. 5]. Performance risk is different from
proposal risk. Proposal risk is the risk associated with an offeror's proposed approach
in meeting the Government's requirements. This assessment is generally performed by
the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) and integrated with the rating of each
evaluation factor [Ref. 18: p. 4]. On the other hand, the PRAG may report to the
Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) or operate as a separate group within the
SSEB. The Army's Comanche Light Helicopter program is using this approach [Ref.
43: p. 22].
This enhancement was originally developed by the Air Force. The Air Force
created a Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). The intent
of CPARS is to evaluate a contractor's past performance and assess the risk involved in
doing business for the contract under consideration. In addition, the PRAG considers
data from the CPARS along with other contractor past performance data to determine
contractor risk [Ref. 23: p. 31]. The Army developed a similar technique because it was
determined that guidance was needed on how to best structure a solicitation and source
selection to provide for a more thorough evaluation of past performance [Ref. 18: p. 2],
Past performance is an element of risk analysis. To perform this assessment, the
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Government may use data provided by the offeror and data obtained from other sources
(extrinsic).
The performance risk assessment process is used in competitively negotiated
procurements in which the source selection is based on a comparative assessment that
determines which proposal offers the best overall value to the Government in terms of
price, performance, and other factors [Ref. 18: p. 3]. These procedures do not apply
to negotiated procurements whereby the evaluation of proposals is only in terms of price
and past performance. This technique is quite useful in procurements for services,
research and development, and major/non major weapon systems [Ref. 4: p. 9]. The
assessment of performance risk is not intended to be a simple arithmetic function.
Performance risk is categorized in one of three ways: high risk, moderate risk, and low
risk. Low risk is defined as a situation where little doubt exists as to the contractor's
performance. The Army applies this process to contracts valued at greater than $10
million while the Air Force's threshold is $5 million. Evaluating past performance is an
important and integral part of best value. In today's acquisition environment, the
Government cannot afford the consequences of a contractor who is a chronically poor
performer.
5. Application and Vulnerability
In general, best value can be used in any acquisition that has a recognized
value to the Government for improvements in terms of quality or suitability. Best-value
contracting is most beneficial in acquisitions that have a history of performance or quality
difficulties, and where the consequences of poor performance are substantial [Ref. 11:
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p. 1-3]. Best-value contracting is not limited to multi-billion dollar, high visibility
procurements; it applies also to both large and small acquisitions. Best value is an
important tool in selecting major defense program sources because it places a premium
on choosing the most likely successful offeror. Many major weapon systems have
benefitted from this approach including the Army's Armored System Modernization
Program (ASM), Comanche Light Helicopter (RAH66), Mobile Subscriber Equipment
(MSE) and the Air Force's Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) and the
Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) [Ref. 43: p. 22]. Best value-contracting is improving
contractor performance and reducing schedule delinquencies. It enables the Government
to receive greater value in terms of technical advantage and innovative design.
In today's environment of rapidly changing commercial technologies, best-
value contracting is a viable concept; however, it is not one that is absolutely trouble-
free. A major trouble area is that of "gaming," which can be caused by both the
Government and industry. Contractor gaming occurs when the contractor proposes
innovations and has little or no intention of fulfilling such proposals. The purpose is to
gain the upper hand in competition for a contract [Ref. 4: p. 70]. Government gaming
is favoritism or putting too much emphasis on one factor. The effect is to limit full and
open competition [Ref. 43: p. 23]. In either case, the pitfall is an "unfair playing field
for all participants. " Therefore, the key is to protect the integrity of the process.
6. Conceptual Importance
Best-value contracting is a viable concept. Best value has relational value to
NDI acquisitions and two-step sealed bidding. Our acquisition environment is changing
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because of commercialization and commercial buying practices. As defense procurement
dollars continue to shrink, best-value NDI procurements can better serve the Department
of Defense's goals. Procurement decisions do not always represent the best value to the
Government. Best-value decisions are based on the "overall or long term worth" to the
Government. The cost then becomes a compilation of various factors reduced to price
in either dollars or long term capability [Ref. 7: p. 17].
The focus then centers on "ownership cost." Ownership cost and dependable
quality are dominant variables in commercial buying decisions [Ref. 37: p. ix]. As
suggested by CODSIA, lowest bid and best value are not necessarily the same.
However, lowest total cost should be related to best value which is tied to realistic life-
cycle system specifications including follow-on operation and support and contractor
performance [Ref. 5: p. 6]. Furthermore, the Packard Commission offered an example
of a way to overcome the problem of determining best value:
The way to overcome it is not by generally exhorting decision makers to focus on
value over price, but rather by providing specific guidance as to how to establish
value. In the ADP area, the Government has already begun to move in this
direction, by setting forth specific criteria for the determination of such relevant
factors as life-cycle costing and present value [Ref. 44: p. 92].
The conclusion deduced is that life-cycle costing is a form of best value. As
Deming remarked, "end the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag only.
Instead, minimize total cost" [Ref. 23: p. 53]. It appears the most successful examples
of two-step sealed bidding are those that use life-cycle costing. The corollary conclusion
is not to say the methods are the same, but rather the literature review suggests that life-
cycle costing is a form of best value. The present manifestation of best-value contracting
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is quite different; however, it seems the best-value concept is not mutually exclusive.
Under two-step sealed bidding, a flexible life-cycle cost structure can result in a value-
based procurement decision that is most beneficial to the Government in terms of
achieving greater long-term worth. There are many factors that can be structured
together and have a lasting impact like a best-value decision.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter provided a critical and in-depth look at nondevelopmental item
acquisitions, two-step sealed bidding, and best-value contracting. The objective was to
provide a framework for determining the feasibility of using a two-step method for
getting best value in NDI acquisitions. More importantly, this chapter provides a
"conduit metaphor" for channeling the research of this thesis. A nondevelopmental item
acquisition represents a philosophical shift in material development. Best value also is
a fundamental shift in our contracting philosophy. Two-step sits in the middle of change.
It is a concept that has fallen into disuse; however, it appears to be a dynamic tool that
has not reached its optimum utility. Chapter III will highlight data collected and
aggregated responses from personal interviews.
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in. A COMPENDIUM OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is a compilation of data collected and compendium of responses from
interviews conducted using a questionnaire developed for this study. Chapter III is
divided into two parts. The first section presents informational data pertaining to DOD's
use of two-step sealed bidding, nondevelopmental item acquisition, and best-value
contracting. The second part contains a discussion and representative sample of
responses for each interview question. Interview questions were based upon an analysis
of the literature review and open-ended in nature. The goal was to elicit responses that
would correlate into meaningful issues for further discussion. The questionnaire is
presented in Appendix D. Initial questions focused on general or conceptual matters with
a steady progression to provocative inquiries. This format was used by the researcher
in consolidating responses in a consistent manner. Prior to the commencement of an
interview, the respondent or interviewee was advised that responses received would be
kept on a non-attribution basis. A list of the participants is contained in Appendix E.
Finally, the respondents represented a cross-section of top-down procurement officials
both in the DOD and Industry. Table 1 highlights the different offices and/or
organizations from which interviewees were drawn.
38
Table 1
A SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED
Activity Respondents (Number)
U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command 6
U.S. Army Project Manager Office, Mobile Subscriber
Equipment
1
Defense Systems Management College 1
U.S. Army Project Manager Office, Night Vision
Electro Optical Devices
2
Aerospace Industries Association 1
U.S. Army Materiel Command 7
Deputy Director for Defense Systems Procurement
Strategies
1
Office of the Director for Defense Procurement 2
Naval Air Systems Command 1
Martin Marietta Corporation 1
Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council 1
U.S. Army Product Manager Office for Mortar
Systems
2
U.S. Army Project Manager Office for Test,
Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment
1
TOTAL 27
SOURCE: Developed by Researcher
The researcher also collected informational data pertaining to DOD's use of two-
step sealed bidding, nondevelopmental items, and best-value contracting. The researcher
accessed the information from three data collection systems: Federal Procurement Data
System (FPDS), Department of Defense (DD350) Data Base, and the Army's
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Acquisition Management Milestone System (AMMS). As identified by the General
Accounting Office, DOD does not have a formal information system to gather and assess
the effectiveness of its NDI acquisitions [Ref. 57: p. 17]. Using the AMMS system, the
researcher collected data to measure and report on the nature and trends of NDI
acquisitions. The researcher conducted a telephone survey involving 27 different Army
NDI acquisitions. The results are presented in Appendix F. In general, the data




PROCUREMENT SOLICITATION PROCEDURES (FULL AND OPEN
COMPETITION) FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE






Sealed Bidding 31,247 28 8,236,556 17
Competitive Proposal 80,370 71 39,270,510 82
Two-Step Sealed Bidding 817 01 381,679 01
TOTAL 112,434 100 47,888,745 100
SOURCE: Federal Procurement Data System
Table 2 compares the utilization rates for each method of procurement used. The
source for Table 2 is the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), which consolidates
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the Department of Defense's actions reported individually on the Standard Form 279 [Ref
58: p. 83]. Two-step sealed bidding has been around for more than 20 years. During
this period it has enjoyed only limited success [Ref. 41: p. III-4]. In 1965, DOD used
the two-step method in 74 acquisitions whose total dollar value was $189,199,000 [Ref
28: p. 4]. This total sum was approximately 2 percent of all procurements. Today, two-
step sealed bidding is almost or less than 1 percent of DOD's procurements, but the total
dollar value has doubled (Table 2). Furthermore, the preferred method of procurement
is competitive proposal.
Tables 3 and 4 show the Army's trend in using two-step sealed bidding. The tables
depict the number of procurement actions (contracts) and the value of dollars expended
for two-step sealed bidding. The activities listed below are major subordinate commands
within the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC). Fiscal Year 92 data reflect current
actions as of 6 August 1992. The source for these data is the Acquisition Business
Trends and Analysis Division, Headquarters, AMC.
Table 3
TOTAL NUMBER OF TWO-STEP SEALED BIDDING ACTIONS
Major Subordinate Command FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92
U.S. Army Armament, Munition and Chemical
Command (AMCCOM)
9 4 11 9 4
U.S. Army Communications and Electronics
Command (CECOM)
16 12 15 19 9
U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) 1 -- - — 1
U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) 1 3 3 - 1
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U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) 5 2 2 3 6
U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) 7 -- 3 1 --
U.S. Army Troop Support Command (TROSCOM) 3 1 4 6 1
U.S. Army Laboratory Command (LABCOM) 1 - - - --
TOTAL 43 22 38 39 23
SOURCE: Acquisition Business Trends and Analysis Division, Headquarters AMC
Table 4
TOTAL DOLLAR VALUE OF TWO-STEP SEALED BIDDING (IN THOUSANDS)
Major Subordinate Command FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92
AMCCOM 508 43,661 9,822 6,662 726
CECOM 24,723 34,741 30,278 20,539 6,142
TECOM 81 — — — 675
TACOM 3,072 23 10,036 ~ 31
MICOM 1,050 82 99 1,333 760
AVSCOM 4,141 — 221 29 —
TROSCOM 3,046 1,999 15,719 15,234 2,362
LABCOM 1,020 -- - -- --
TOTALS 36,625 80,506 66,175 43,797 10,696
SOURCE: Acquisition Business Trends and Analysis Division, Headquarters AMC
Since 1989, the total value of two-step procurements has been steadily declining.
In 1987, for instance, the Army awarded $550.4 million in two-step procurements
[Ref. 41: p. III-4]. By comparison, the 1991 dollar figure represented 8 percent of the
1987 total value (Table 4). Moreover, in earlier years, the Army accounted for the
largest use of two-step sealed bidding. For instance, in 1965, the Army accounted for
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45 percent of the total dollar value [Ref. 28: p. 4]. In 1991, the Army only accounted
for 11 percent of the total value expended on two-step sealed bidding (Tables 4 and 1).
This trend could be a result of the impetus and preference for using best-value
contracting. It could also represent a procurement shift from acquiring stand-alone
systems to spares and components.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is no DOD-wide information system that
monitors the uses and trends of NDI procurements. The Army, however, does have an
automated system that tracks nondevelopmental items, but the AMMS is limited. It does
not provide any meaningful data or data that contribute to measuring the effectiveness
of NDI acquisitions. For instance, the listing does not specify the method of
procurement used or clarify the type or degree of nondevelopmental effort [Ref. 54: p.
1]. Recall, NDI covers an entire umbrella or spectrum of commercially available
alternatives [Ref. 15: p. 2-3]. As shown in Appendix B, the intended benefits of an NDI
acquisition diminish as the item moves away from pure "off-the-shelf to full
developmental items. This is important when assessing the overall effectiveness of an
NDI acquisition.
A summary of the results of this survey is highlighted in Appendix F. Let's
examine the results more closely and identify any possible developing trends. The
majority of acquisitions were competed (85 percent). In looking at the different methods
of procurement, competitive proposal outpaced the other methods by almost 50 percent.
Interestingly, 15 percent of the NDI acquisitions surveyed used two-step sealed bidding.
There was a notable change in the commercial product areas that are typically suited for
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NDI acquisitions. A commercial area showing a new emergence is weapon systems.
For instance, the Army purchased the following nondevelopmental items: a light
howitzer (M119A1), two mortar systems (120/81mm), and a vehicle mounted stinger
(FAADS Avenger). In the past, the Defense Science Board (DSB) found "destructive
weapons" as an area not susceptible to commercial product acquisitions [Ref. 13: p. 17].
However, the DSB did not exclude the possible uses of NDI subsystems or components.
The survey also showed interesting results when considering the different
classifications of nondevelopmental effort being acquired. The survey's classification
criteria are derived from the provisions of the statutory definition (Appendices A and F).
When considering the different classifications, the largest category was products or items
"not yet available" in the commercial marketplace (44 percent). In addition, these items
also required a great deal of systems integration. The next largest NDI product area was
"minor modification" with a rating of 33 percent. The third largest grouping was
"foreign already developed" items at 11 percent.
These results show that the Army (and perhaps all Services) is (are) concentrating
procurement efforts on items requiring greater research and development effort. This
could mean that the intended benefits and cost savings associated to NDI acquisitions are
diminishing. The predominant use of an NDI is at the subsystem or component level for
major developmental programs [Ref. 15: p. 2-3]. Finally, with 71 percent of the
competitive proposals using best-value contracting as currently practiced, best value is




How would you define "best-value" contracting as a procurement concept?
a. Discussion
Many of the respondents believed the term "best value" was not clearly
defined. Almost 50 percent of the interviewees defined the practice as a competitive
basis for award in which other factors in addition to price can be considered in some
relative order of importance to determine the winning proposal [Ref. 51: p. 1]. In other
words, it meant assessing the competitive offer that would be most advantageous to the
Government when considering both price and non-price factors. Four respondents
believed that FAR Subpart 15.6 adequately addressed the "best value" concept. These
individuals claimed that "best value" was the proposal which offered the greatest value
to the Government in terms of performance and other factors [Ref. 20: 15.605(c)].
Many individuals stressed that the key was to properly identify and tailor the evaluation
criteria to the distinct qualities of the item. In other words, the factors that determined
best value under a particular contracting methodology differ from one application to
another. The relative weights and order of importance must be specified in the
solicitation [Ref. 16: p. 10-B-4]. The goal was to strike a balance between cost and
performance factors.
The majority of respondents agreed that the process was highly
discretionary, and that best value was perceived as the antithesis to the concept of lowest
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price. Three interviewees characterized the process as an "integrative assessment" using
cost and non-cost factors. Interestingly, seven participants said that "best value" was not
a new concept. The present adaptation was an attempt to transfer an existing
methodology from major systems acquisition to non-major systems acquisition. The
origin for this movement was the 1986 Packard Commission.
The goal was to better formalize the process. In comparison, some
respondents believed that the only real difference from the past was today's focus on
contractor past performance. Two respondents described that best value, as a
methodology, was an attempt to incorporate the consumer's "prudent person" buying
concept into Government procurement. In other words, it was a common-sense approach
to contracting. One respondent described best value as an attempt to get people to think
"holistically," and that a procurement may be based on factors other than just price. It
was also getting the most reliability for the least amount of dollars spread over a
product's lifetime. Finally, an interviewee thought that best value could be interpreted
in various contexts or circumstances. The respondent believed that best value existed in
more than one procurement situation. That is, the outcome could be represented as the
highest quality, least costly, most cost-effective, or highest affordable performance.
b. Responses
The following comments are reflective of responses received during the
interviews:
"Best value" means any basis for award which states that factors in addition to
price will be considered in some relative order of importance to determine the
winning proposal.
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"Best value," as a process, attempts to strike a balance between cost and
performance factors. It is a conscious departure from the concept of lowest priced
offeror.
It is an integrated assessment that considers price and non-price factors.
In practice, the term, best value, considers evaluation factors in addition to price
to assess which competitive offer is the most advantageous to the Government.
"Best value" is a common-sense approach that applies the similar thought processes
of a consumer to Government procurement.
"Best value" is not a new concept; it has been around for many years in major
systems acquisition.
A best-value acquisition may be based upon long-term worth or life-cycle costs.
It is getting the most reliability for the least amount of dollars spread over a
product's lifetime.
2. Question #2
How would you define the concept of nondevelopmental item acquisition?
a. Discussion
The definition or concept of an NDI acquisition caused much controversy
among the respondents. Six interviewees concurred with the existing statutory definition
(Appendix A). However, seven individuals felt that it should only represent items that
were either "commercial off-the-shelf" or "products already in use." A
nondevelopmental item acquisition could then require "minor modification." Many
respondents associated "minor" to mean slightly or less seriously needed changes. For
others, it was a process to acquire an item which the Government did not have to
develop. The theory behind the process was getting a product out more quickly at less
cost, and with improved quality. One interviewee thought the fundamental objective of
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an NDI procurement was to first identify existing technologies and commercially
available products. Then, the Government would choose from among the different
alternatives the one which came closest to meeting its needs. If needed, the Government
would contract for any developmental effort. The idea, according to the interviewee,
was to optimize the present situation and avoid a costly full development effort.
The interviewees described many concerns about NDI acquisitions. One
concern was the apparent focus on "military or environmental" adaptation. Some
respondents believed the "proven out" or so called first article tests were really
environmental qualification tests. Such tests can require up to 42 months of effort and
cost as much as the first year of production deliveries. Another area of concern was the
vagueness and lack of clarity of what constituted "minor modification. " One interviewee
believed that an NDI strategy should exploit developmental work already performed by
others either through direct adaptation or by modification of existing products. Many
respondents suggested that there had been numerous programs that were supposed to be
"nondevelopmental," but some developmental effort had been required after entering the
production phase. Minor modification meant insignificant changes to an already
producible product. Insignificant changes were changes which required little to no design
or development effort by a contractor. Respondents also noted that as the Government
increased the need for modifications, it found itself unfairly requiring industry to finance
the cost of developing military unique capabilities. Respondents repeated that contractors
should not have to pay for such work. They expressed concern over managing the cost
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driver—rapidly changing technologies. They believed that the Government's inability to
manage technology insertion was trapping us into a world of technology obsolescence.
b. Responses
NDI is a commercially available item that is either off-the-shelf or available very
soon. It is used "as is" or "slightly modified." The Government did not have to
develop the product.
NDI is the acquisition of off-the-shelf hardware and software, or in a sophisticated
system, it is the marriage of existing technologies.
The concern is abusing what is meant by "minor modification" and inadvertently
forcing the contractor to pay for needed developmental effort. Minor modification
should constitute insignificant changes that would require little design or
development effort by a contractor to incorporate into his already existing product.
It is a methodology designed to identify existing technologies or commercially
available items in the commercial marketplace, and then choose among the
alternatives, the one which comes closest to meeting our needs. Then, the
Government contracts for the needed developmental effort.
3. Question #3
To what extent can the concept of best value be used in two-step sealed
bidding?
a. Discussion
Eight respondents found an inherent conflict between two-step sealed
bidding and best-value contracting. They believed these methods were different because
the process of how to select the winner was different. Their position was that since the
criterion for award in step two was the lowest priced, technically acceptable offeror,
there was no tradeoff allowed between a bidder that was "technically acceptable" and one
that was the "best technically." Other respondents viewed the question from a holistic
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standpoint. It was a philosophical shift in Government contracting. The new focus was
to get the maximum benefit for minimal cost. Six interviewees suggested that the
technical evaluation in step one was a means of applying best value. The process of
evaluating the merits of an offeror's technical approach enabled each contractor to
propose how he intended to meet the technical requirements of the contract. It was in
this step that each bidder distinguished himself from the others. However, two-step did
not go far enough. The Government did not have the opportunity to select between
differences in price and technical proposals.
Some respondents believed it was possible to obtain best value by
establishing a pre-determined weighting between price and technical that would enable
the Government to exercise tradeoff considerations. Another interviewee expanded on
this idea. The first action was to establish a weighted evaluation in step one, and then
subsequently score the weighted ratings in step two. Next, the scores would be
expressed in terms of dollars to determine the most advantageous procurement. The key
was to have an objective scheme for weighting factors. Also, three interviewees
suggested that using life-cycle cost could produce a best-value procurement. That is,
long-term worth or cost of ownership went beyond the initial contract price with the basis
for contract award considering the total impact of ownership costs. The goal being to
minimize the life-cycle cost over the product's life span.
b. Responses
The key difference lies in the concept of how to pick the winning proposal. Under
two-step sealed bidding, the basis for award is the lowest priced, technically
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acceptable offeror. However, unlike best value, there is no ability to consider
tradeoffs between price and technical proposals.
The concept of best value applies to two-step sealed bidding in the sense that step
one acts like a pre-screening process, and step two can evaluate the long-term
worth by life-cycle costing.
The process of evaluating the merits of an offeror's technical approach could be
considered a means of applying the best-value concept to a procurement.
4. Question #4
To what extent do we use two-step sealed bidding in nondevelopmental items?
Are there any threads or traces of best value?
a. Discussion
In general, the respondents felt that two-step sealed bidding was not being
widely used. Most interviewees believed that a negotiated procurement was the preferred
method because it was not bound to a rigid contract award basis like two-step. Six
interviewees thought that two-step sealed bidding was best suited for acquiring
nondevelopmental items where there was little or no modification to an existing item.
They felt that the evaluation criteria in step one and price-related factors in step two
offered traces of the concept of best value because the evaluation criteria contained
quality factors such as reliability or maintainability. Three respondents also thought that
certain "price-related" factors resembled best value. They noted that the key factor was
to use life-cycle costing which considered more than just the initial contract price.
However, in their opinion, what limited the best-value concept was the go/no-go process
for evaluating technical proposals in step one. In addition, performance risk could not
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be adequately assessed. Best value could measure an offeror's recent and relevant past
performance to indicate the likelihood of successful performance [Ref. 18: p. 2]. On the
other hand, two-step could only evaluate past performance as a function of responsibility
determination [Ref. 44: p. 88].
b. Responses
Two-step sealed bidding is a responsible approach when the Government is looking
for a nondevelopmental item to meet a requirement. Best value is inherently part
of the two-step method. Both the technical criteria in step one and price-related
factors in step two may address the concept of best value.
Two-step sealed bidding is best suited for NDI procurements where there is little
or no modification effort to an existing item.
Structuring the level of acceptability high enough could lead to a best-value
procurement.
A person could argue that the technically acceptable, lowest priced offeror is really
best value, since we are accepting a proposal that has "technical merit" and then
awarding the contract to the lowest priced offeror.
A problem with two-step is that a contractor has no incentive to exceed the
minimum standards of acceptability because the methodology does not give extra
credit for additional features.
5. Question #5
To what degree do you think that best-value contracting and two-step sealed
bidding are directly in conflict?
a. Discussion
The majority of interviewees felt that two-step sealed bidding and best-
value contracting conflicted in two main areas. First, two-step sealed bidding was
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limited to making the contract award to the lowest priced offeror. Second, unlike best-
value contracting, there was no flexibility to determine which proposal was more
acceptable than another. In other words, they believed that a technically superior
proposal in step one carried no additional weight in step two. But they also noted, best-
value contracting had the flexibility to determine if advantageous aspects (additional
features) of a proposal were worth the extra cost [Ref. 20: p. 1].
Others did not necessarily consider these methods in conflict. They felt
the problem occurred when the operational definition of "best value" was inconsistent
with the procedures of two-step sealed bidding. That is, the only real perceived
difference was that two-step sealed bidding could not make an award of a contract to a
higher priced offeror. They felt that two-step sealed bidding was a "filtering out
process" that tried to eliminate unqualified offerors in the first step. When pursuing the
costs of ownership, best value was then applied. Price became only one part of the
equation. There were many different ways to gauge best value. The key was to specify
the value wanted. For the Government, it was in terms of essential requirements.
b. Responses
They are in conflict only when the operational definition of "best value" is
inconsistent with two-step sealed bidding.
There is a direct conflict between two-step sealed bidding and best-value
contracting. Two-step sealed bidding requires awarding a contract to the lowest
responsive and responsible bidder. Under best-value contracting, the Government
may award to an offeror who does not have the lowest price.
They are not in conflict necessarily, but rather it is a historical interpretation that
has become embedded. The only real difference is that two-step sealed bidding
cannot award a contract to a higher priced offeror.
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6. Question #6
In using two-step sealed bidding, does the requirement of "minimum
acceptability" restrict the Government's ability to choose the best "technically qualified"
offeror in purchasing nondevelopmental items?
a. Discussion
For many respondents, minimum or essential requirements were by
nature restrictive. In other words, a minimum or technically acceptable product was not
the same as the best or most technically qualified item. Without some method to
measure quality in proposals, the Government was not always able to obtain the best
qualified product. The criteria for measuring quality were costs such as routine
maintenance, reliability, cost of major repairs, and life-cycle cost. In addition, the
minimum standards of acceptability acted like a floor that restricted the Government's
ability to choose a better valued proposal. As one interviewee claimed, this requirement
prevented extra credit or additional consideration for quality differentiation among
proposals. It was noted that two-step sealed bidding should not be used when it was
important to consider varying degrees of quality among competing alternatives. One
respondent believed the central problem was the Government's inability to provide an
adequate description of requirements. Finally, there would not be a perceived "best
value" problem if the Government provided an adequate description of the level of
quality needed and sound quantitative criteria for evaluating offers.
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b. Responses
By its very nature, "minimum acceptability" is not the best or most technically
qualified. Under two-step sealed bidding, there is no added credit or weight given
for quality differences among proposals.
It is important to realize that two-step sealed bidding cannot be used when it is
important to consider varying degrees of quality among competing alternatives.
Minimum or acceptable quality will likely result in the Government acquiring only
acceptable products.
Without an adequate description of the needed level of quality and sound
quantitative criteria for evaluating offers, there would not be a perceived "best
value" problem.
7. Question #7
To what extent can two-step sealed bidding result in the procurement of
nondevelopmental, items which are not the best, in terms of quality, because award of
the contract is based on the lowest priced offeror that meets the Government's minimum
requirements?
a. Discussion
Nine respondents believed that when the Government used two-step
sealed bidding, the items acquired were "acceptable" but probably not the "best." Two-
step sealed bidding did not allow for additional considerations when a proposal exceeded
the minimum standards of acceptability. Further, the basis for award (lowest priced
offeror) could not consider any degree of variation in quality, not even a $1.00 of
difference in price. Many interviewees felt that this issue would never happen because
the assumption in using two-step sealed bidding was that differences in performance or
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quality of available products were not important to the acquisition decision. Some
respondents indicated that procurements not representing best value are caused by the
Government's inability to adequately define requirements. The key to acquiring
successful products under a two-step method would be for the Government to develop
fully its quality requirements, and insist that all bidders demonstrate the same in their
proposals. If the standards that were acceptable could not result in the delivery of a
quality product, then the first step of two-step sealed bidding would not work.
b. Responses
If it is important to consider additional features in our acquisition decision, then
two-step sealed bidding is not the correct procurement procedure to employ.
Two-step sealed bidding is infinitely vulnerable to acquiring nondevelopmental
items which are not the best because two-step cannot consider any degree of
variation in quality, not even $1.00 of difference in price.
The acquisition of items offered at the lowest price but which meet the
Government's minimum requirements should not be viewed as a problem. The real
problem is the Government's failure to adequately define the requirements.
Step one is the key to acquiring quality products under two-step sealed bidding.
The Government has to develop fully its quality requirements, and insist that all
bidders demonstrate the same in their proposals. If the standards which are
acceptable will not result in the delivery of a quality product, then two-step sealed
bidding will not work.
8. Question #8
Are there any advantages to purchasing a more desirable (technically
superior) nondevelopmental item at a very slightly higher bid price?
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a. Discussion
The majority of interviewees agreed that there could be advantages to
buying a technically superior product. Some advantages mentioned were higher
reliability, expanded performance, longer life span, ease of maintenance, and expanded
warranties. As suggested, what was more important was the "cost of ownership" and
not the initial contract price. It was also noted as being important to include risk and
quality factors into a consideration that measured long-term worth. Respondents said
life-cycle cost provided this measure. In their opinion, a "reality check" was still needed
because the cost of maintaining a technically superior product could have exceeded the
acquisition cost of a suitable and quality product that met the Government's requirements.
b. Responses
The real issue is that we are not sufficiently aware of all the products available in
the marketplace. What we really need is the ability to acquire what we need now,
and the ability to modify it through technology insertion. We must learn to
manage change.
What is more important is the cost of ownership when you consider a product's
lifespan instead of the initial price.
How does "technically superior" relate to quality? The cost of maintenance for a
technically superior product could exceed the acquisition cost of a high quality item
that meets our minimum needs.
The advantages of procuring a technically superior and higher priced item must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. The Government must be able to demonstrate
that the "added value" is worth the extra cost.
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9. Question #9
Could the acquisition of nondevelopmental items be improved, if there is a
procurement method that encompasses the principles of best value and two-step sealed
bidding?
a. Discussion
For the most part, the respondents could not see a need to develop a new
procurement method for acquiring nondevelopmental items. Further, the interviewees
believed that contracting by negotiation (competitive proposal) was the most effective
method of procurement for buying nondevelopmental items. A competitive proposal was
a method of procurement that was already defined and where the contract award was
based on price and other factors. However, seven interviewees believed that if two-step
sealed bidding could in some way employ the principles of "best value," then two-step
sealed bidding would be improved greatly. One respondent felt the real answer was to
use award-fee contracts.
Many interviewees believed there was still a place for using two-step
sealed bidding as well as improving it. Four interviewees suggested that the technical
evaluation in step one could be improved. One responded suggested developing a
"weighted scale" for scoring and ranking technical proposals. Another respondent
suggested the possibility of developing a "best value" matrix that could be used to inform
bidders of possible tradeoffs that the Government intended to make. In either case, the
appropriate weighting could be pre-determined. Two-step sealed bidding offered the
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benefit of highlighting each contractor's technical plan to accomplish the required effort,
but it could not go far enough to either quantify or allow for the selection of the best
overall value. Finally, many respondents felt that the process that governed "best value"
should be formalized.
b. Responses
If two-step sealed bidding could in some ways employ the principles of "best
value," then two-step sealed bidding would be improved greatly.
There is still a place for two-step sealed bidding. Perhaps some form of a "best
value" matrix could be developed and used to inform bidders of the possible
tradeoffs, which the Government intends to make.
There is no real benefit that can be derived from either a new or hybrid method.
Competitive proposal is a method of procurement that is already defined and the
best for acquiring nondevelopmental items.
10. Question #10
Could it be beneficial to award a contract without negotiations while
considering price and quality-related factors?
a. Discussion
Eleven interviewees believed it could be beneficial; however, the majority
of respondents did not see any benefit because the Government could already award a
contract without discussions. Four interviewees felt that quality could be addressed in
two-step sealed bidding. Others suggested the following methodology as a way to
consider price and quality under a two-step process. In step one, each proposal would
receive a numerical score based on an assessment of major technical subfactors. Next,
the proposals would be ranked in order from best to acceptable. Scores would then be
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converted in terms of dollars. The Government could then make tradeoffs between
overall price and technical proposals. With an adequate description of the essential
requirements, procurement officials would then apply sound evaluation criteria to
determine which of the products was most advantageous for the Government.
b. Responses
Contract award without discussions is an option currently available to the
Government.
The following methodology is a way to consider price and quality factors. In step
one, each proposal receives a numerical score based on an assessment of major
technical subfactors. The proposals are then ranked in order from best to
acceptable. Next, the scores are considered in terms of dollars. The Government
could then make tradeoffs between overall price and technical proposals.
11. Question #11
Could it be better to use a "band of performance" concept which identifies
a minimum level of performance required, and a maximum or limit on how far the
Government wants the offeror to exceed the specified minimum? In doing so, would the
"band" concept best serve the Government in obtaining the "best price" or "best buy?"
a. Discussion
On the surface, the "band of performance" approach appeared to make
sense. However, many respondents felt that any attempt to set limits could cause
problems. This concept was used by the Government for some time. The major concern
expressed was that as the "band" gets wider, then the Government would be encouraging
the submission of potentially high risk and high cost solutions to achieve greater
performance. Greater performance usually cost more money. The respondents believe
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that both the Government and industry stood to lose. Fair and open competition were
important; however, the Government needed to specify carefully its essential
requirements. There was no need to acquire a product that exceeded our needs just
because the product was available. An interviewee claimed that the emphasis must be
placed on defining our requirements in a manner that precluded the acquisition of
products that were of such poor quality that they could not meet our essential
requirements. In the acquisition of nondevelopmental items, this feature could restrict
the availability of alternatives. In other words, there was nothing the offeror could do
in the proposal to change the performance characteristics of the product.
b. Responses
We don't want a limit or "band of performance" when dealing with advanced
commercial technologies.
On the surface, the "band of performance" concept appears to make sense, but both
the contractor and Government stand to lose because of the difficulty in defining
the upper limit.
The band of performance concept has been used by the Government for some time
now. When the "band" get wider, then the Government is encouraging the
submission of high risk and high cost solutions to achieve greater performance.
D. SUMMARY
Chapter III reviewed the findings of the interview process and presented
summaries, in abstract, of the interviewees' responses. Emerging from this effort were
broad perspectives and converging ideas that collaborated the theoretical framework of
this study and supported the research focus. In particular, the concept of best value was
considered by respondents to be broader than currently identified, and its application was
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not limited to only negotiated procurements. Many respondents expressed concerns about
the effectiveness of NDI acquisitions focusing primarily on items that were not truly
"nondevelopmental." When incorporating the notion of "best value" into a two-step
method, most respondents believed that two-step could not go far enough to capture the
real essence of best value. Chapter IV will identify and analyze the major issues or
concerns that have unfolded from the interview results and the materials previously
researched.
62
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this chapter is to examine the validity of the research, which pertains
to best-value contracting, nondevelopmental item acquisition, and two-step sealed
bidding. It will identify and analyze the major problems or issues that have resulted
from the interviews and materials previously researched. Three significant issues have
been identified. The first issue focuses on the concept of best value. As discussed
earlier, best value is not clearly defined. It is likely that best value has a broader context
or definition rather than its current prescription. The second major issue is the
increasing concern over the effectiveness of NDI acquisitions. The underlying concerns
are acquiring items that are not truly "nondevelopmental," defining minor modification,
and managing technology insertion. The final issue is establishing a union between the
concept of best value and two-step sealed bidding. As identified earlier, two-step has
inherent aspects of best value, but it may not go far enough to capture the full impact of
best value. It is the researcher's contention that a two-step process can promote a value-
based procurement decision that is related to a best-value approach.
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B. THE PROBLEM OF UNCLEAR REGULATORY GUIDANCE
1. Defining Best Value
The first major problem is the lack of clear regulatory guidance concerning
best value. Many respondents believed the term "best value" was not clearly defined.
The literature also indicates that no standard or operational definition exists in the FAR
or DFARS [Ref. 24: p. 1]. The current practice of best value has manifested from
Subpart 15.6 that describes the Government's official policy on source selection in
competitively negotiated procurements. The FAR does not provide explicit regulatory
guidance on how to measure best value; it simply encourages the use of best-value
contracting [Ref. 24: p. 3]. For many interviewees, best value meant assessing the
competitive offer that would be most advantageous to the Government when considering
other factors than just price. For the most part, the interviewees defined best value
within the scope of the prescribed definition. In other words, the Government may select
the source whose proposal offers the greatest value to the Government in terms of
performance and other factors [Ref. 20: 15.605(c)]. The current regulatory guidance
relies upon the skill and judgment of contracting officers to effectively implement this
concept [Ref. 24: p. 3].
There are many practical and legal issues that are not adequately addressed.
Government and contractor "gaming" causes an unfair playing field for all participants
[Ref. 4: p. 70]. There is increasing concern over the credibility of evaluating a
contractor's past performance as well as inconsistent decisions by the Source Selection
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Authority (SSA). Improper identification and inconsistent use of evaluation factors
increase the probability of error and invite protests [Ref. 4: p. 54]. In essence, best
value is too subjective to remain unchecked while still protecting the integrity of the
process. In today's world of rapidly changing commercial technologies, best-value
contracting is certainly a viable concept; however, it is not one that is trouble-free [Ref.
43: p. 23]. Even with the recent success and proliferation of best-value contracting, it
is still an anomaly. It is important that the Government consider adopting a standard
definition to facilitate and promote uniformity and understanding of best value.
However, the goal should not be to emplace a regulatory constriction on the process, but
rather ensure the Government uses the process wisely. The following table highlights
the evolutionary stages of best value.
Table 5














• Most for the Dollar
• Life-Cycle Cost (LCC)
Substituted For Price
• Compilation of Quantifiable
LCC Factors
• Assessment of Long-Term
Worth









SOURCE: Developed By Researcher
65
The concept of "best value" is not new. Many respondents said that "best
value" was not a new concept. It was an attempt to transfer an existing methodology
from major systems acquisition to non-major systems acquisition. The literature sources
also describe that best value has assumed several forms over the years [Ref. 39: p. 33].
It appears then that the current form has evolved from major systems acquisition (Table
5). In the past, systems acquisition typically involved a complex ranking and evaluation
of objective and subjective factors. A decade ago, agencies commonly used explicit
mathematical formulas to balance cost and quality [Ref. 39: p. 33]. Major systems
acquisition fostered the philosophy of getting "the most for the dollar." In doing so, the
Services concentrated too much on acquisition price and not enough on the cost of
ownership for a system over its life span [Ref. 34: p. 118]. Life-cycle costing was a
stepping stone in the right direction for measuring best value [Ref. 44: p. 92].
The complexities and challenges of today's acquisition environment fostered
the growing need for best-value contracting. Best-value contracting is a spin-off of the
classical commercial buying objective: "to buy products of the right quality, in the right
quantity, at the right price, from the right sources and at the right time" [Ref. 35: p. 25].
Like a consumer that has been "ripped off," the Defense Department can no longer
tolerate contractor buy-in approaches that in the past paralyzed major systems
acquisitions [Ref. 43: p. 20]. In addition, our Defense procurements concentrated too
heavily on price competition [Ref. 45: p. 62]. Like all buyers, the Government also
wants "value" for their purchase dollar. Best value shifted from a mathematical or
formulaic process into a more flexible, yet structured, approach that resembled the
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thought process of an average consumer [Ref. 35: p. 25]. Best-value contracting
emphasizes a "value-based approach. " The Federal Government uses best value in a net-
value metric rather than a return-on-investment (ROI) metric [Ref. 39: p. 34]. For
example, a Mercedes Benz car might appear to have a higher net-value than a Ford
Taurus; however, the total cost of owning a Mercedes could far exceed the value added
by the additional and more expensive features.
The 1986 Packard Commission fostered the realization that awarding a
contract solely on the basis of lowest price can create a false economy if there is
subsequent default due to unsatisfactory performance [Ref. 20: 9.103(c)]. The
Commission further recommended that DOD increase its use of commercial style
competition by emphasizing quality and established performance as well as price [Ref.
45: p. 62]. Best-value contracting is a subjective determination of the value for a
particular product. The key to using best value successfully is: (1) consideration of life-
cycle costs, and (2) marginal analysis, the use of quantitative as well as qualitative
techniques to measure price and performance tradeoffs between competing proposals
[Ref. 24: p. 2]. The value or worth to the Government must be based on consideration
of the resource investment needed to fulfill the requirement. The "worth" is the
judgment exercised by the Government [Ref. 49: p. 7], As W. Edwards Deming
describes, the inherent difficulty in this process is to define the needed level of quality
or value:
The difficulty in defining quality is to translate future needs of the user into
measurable characteristics, so that a product can be designed and turned out to give
satisfaction at a price that the user will pay. ..[Ref. 34: p. 16].
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Best-value contracting is a departure from the traditional source selection
process in that selection is not made based upon minimum standards of acceptability, but
rather on the basis of the offer that demonstrates the highest probability of successful
performance [Ref. 12: p. 6]. While many interviewees conveyed similar points, the
current practice gives the Government greater flexibility to consider price and
performance tradeoffs in order to determine the best overall value. Also, the current
approach incorporates the evaluation of past performance to assess the probability of
successful accomplishment of the proposed effort [Ref. 18: p. 10-B-6]. In other words,
the purpose of measuring a contractor's past performance is to determine whether a
contractor is going to perform the contract successfully, rather than is the contractor
capable of performing the contract. The former is a performance risk assessment that
examines an offeror's recent and relevant past performance to indicate the likelihood of
successful performance [Ref. 18: p. 2]. The latter is a responsibility determination.
Responsibility determinations are limited to determining whether or not an offeror has
the satisfactory capability to perform the contract and can meet the minimum standards
of acceptability. The determination is based on a go/no-go decision [Ref. 11: p. 1-3].
Consequently, the ability to assess risk is greatly reduced. This difference is important
because best-value contracting is a relative assessment of risk [Ref. 4: p. 30].
2. Challenging the Preconceptions of Best Value
The concept of best value has steadily changed over the years [Ref. 39: p.
33]. It is possible that best value does not have to be limited to negotiated procurements.
However, many interviewees felt that best value only applied to competitively negotiated
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procurements. The objective of best-value contracting is to select the proposal that is
"most advantageous" to the Government considering price and non-price factors [Ref.
57: p. 29]. The evaluation factors that determine the best-value award are uniquely
tailored to each procurement. Under sealed bidding, a contract is awarded to a
responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation, will be "most advantageous"
to the Government, considering only price and price-related factors [Ref. 20: 14.407-
1(c)(3)]. Likewise, under negotiated procurements, the award decision is based on the
most advantageous procurement. The similarity of language implies that both
procurement methods have of a value-based decision. Possibly, our legislative
lawmakers envisioned a greater use for best value. This claim is confirmed by
interviewees who work closely on the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council.
Cost of ownership is related to best value because life-cycle cost is a measure
of value [Ref. 5: p. 6]. Many respondents held this contention to be true. In general,
a best-value methodology focuses on minimizing discounted life-cycle costs, not the
acquisition price as the relevant cost measure [Ref. 35: p. 31]. Ownership cost and
dependable quality are critical aspects of any commercial buying decision [Ref. 37: p.
ix]. Likewise, they are important to the Government's practice of best-value contracting.
The Packard Commission concluded that the Government is moving in the right direction
to establish guidance on how to measure best value by using life-cycle costing [Ref. 44:
p. 92]. It is then logical to deduce that life-cycle costing is a method of achieving best
value.
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Best value is applied to circumstances when evaluation factors, in addition
to price, are considered to assess which competitive offeror will be most advantageous
to the Government [Ref. 51: p. 1]. A best-value decision is not restricted to either the
highest priced offeror or necessarily the lowest priced offeror. Consequently, each
procurement has the option to focus on either the acquisition price or total cost of
ownership. Two-step sealed bidding can result in a value-based procurement decision
whereby the product outcome is most suitable or beneficial to the Government in terms
of achieving greater long-term worth. Some respondents deduced that two-step uses a
form of best value—life-cycle costing. In this manner, two-step allows a pre-stated, non-
price but price-related factor to influence source selection [Ref. 40: p. 230]. Life-cycle
cost is substituted for price as the decision criterion. As a result, the criterion for
contract award is no longer price. Instead, it is a total cost of ownership that covers the
useful life of a product [Ref. 40: p. 239].
There is no truly over-arching approach to best-value contracting. Best value
can apply to any acquisition that has recognized value to the Government in terms of
quality or suitability. By its nature, it appears that the best-value concept can be applied
to procurements using two-step sealed bidding. Best value attempts to quantify the value
of individual areas of a contractor's proposal. The Government tries to obtain the most
beneficial tradeoff between competing factors of contractor proposals. The value
determined by the Government must be balanced against the resource investment to fulfill
the requirement. Best value applies to both large and small acquisitions. Best value is
still evolving in DOD [Ref. 43: p. 23]. It can better serve DOD if it is defined in a
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manner that stresses the functionality and importance of the existing interrelationship
between price and value.
C. UNDERLYING ISSUES OF NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM ACQUISITIONS
1. Understanding the Meaning of "Nondevelopmental"
The second problematic area is maximizing the effectiveness of NDI
acquisitions. The interview results indicate three major underlying concerns: acquiring
items that are not truly "nondevelopmental," defining the minor modification, and
managing technology insertion. A nondevelopmental item acquisition represents a
philosophical shift in requirements planning and material development [Ref. 15: p. 1-1].
The NDI concept covers a spectrum of commercially available alternatives, ranging from
those items purely "off-the-shelf" to developmental items with NDI subsystems and/or
components (Appendix B). Typically, nondevelopmental items are products already
developed and capable of fulfilling operational requirements either "as is" or with "minor
modification. " The underlying purpose of an NDI acquisition is to minimize or eliminate
the need for costly, time-consuming, Government-sponsored research and development
programs [Ref. 15: p. 1-1]. The 1986 Packard Commission recognized the need for
developing new custom-made items only when it had been established that those items
readily available were inadequate to meet military requirements [Ref. 45: p. 60]. There
is no DOD-wide information system that provides any meaningful data to measure the
effectiveness of NDI procurements [Ref. 57: p. 17]. As a result, many interviewees
were concerned over what is meant by "nondevelopmental."
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This concern is further evident by the data collected (Appendix F). The data
indicate a possible trend by the Army to concentrate procurement efforts on items "not
yet available" in the commercial marketplace. For the most part, these products required
greater levels of systems integration (Appendix F). Research and development costs are
likely to increase and the intended cost savings decrease [Ref. 15: p. 2-3]. Many
respondents felt that we should be acquiring nondevelopment items that were "off-the-
shelf or "already in use."
NDI acquisitions are supported by both Government and industry. While
conceptually sound, current practices have flawed its implementation [Ref. 22: p. 1].
In some cases, the Defense Department has characterized procurements as
"nondevelopmental" when there is no commercially available product to meet the
Government's needs [Ref. 60: p. 1]. In 1991, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition clarified the legislative intent for the preference of nondevelopmental items:
When no commercially available products are available to meet properly drafted
specification requirements, it is not appropriate to encourage contractors to make
substantial investments in development, testing, tooling, or facilitization as part of
the proposal process to "prove" the feasibility of an NDI acquisition [Ref. 60: p.
1].
To better clarify the intent of the NDI requirements process, the following summary
highlights the "true" intent of the legislative Act:
When conducted correctly, an NDI should result in the Government's selection of
an existing item which, by either evaluation or testing, demonstrates the potential
to meet the user's optimum requirement with a minimum of subsequent
development, cost, schedule, or technical risk [Ref. 22: p. 1].
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"Nondevelopmental" is not intended to be an oxymoron. It simply means "not requiring
development" [Ref. 60: p. 1]. However, it does not preclude the possible requirement
of Government-funded development. The goal of an NDI acquisition is to choose an
existing commercial product that best meets our needs, even though it may not meet all
the Government's requirements, but could if there is subsequent investment of minimal
development needed. Further guidelines that are consistent with the legislative intent of
Congress are highlighted below.
Table 6
NDI GUIDELINES CONSISTENT WITH THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF CONGRESS
1. An NDI procurement should be expressly defined as one in which the
government is soliciting proposals for:
• An existing item
• That proposal evaluation and source selection will be based upon the
degree to which the selected item (as it now exists) best meets the
government's needs;
• The government's needs should be articulated as the item which, in its
present configuration and without further development, offers the
greatest potential to achieve through subsequent government funding of
development, if any, the stated requirements with a minimum of
technical, cost, schedule, or performance risk.
2. Contractor funding of pre-contract development effort to optimize the
performance of the subject item should not be encouraged or required in the
solicitation.
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3. The government's performance requirements should be stated as a baseline
against which the offeror's proposal will be evaluated and/or the hardware
offered tested, but should not be a requirement going to contractor
responsiveness.
4. Modifications made to the proffered hardware to the prospective contractor's
initiative before submission of proposals or contract award will not be
evaluated if they address essential performance characteristics.
5. Minor modifications or corrections may be made to hardware under test at the
contractor's expense if required to permit continuance and or completion of
the test. Offerors should not be encouraged or required to redesign essential
performance characteristics of the hardware under test to enhance performance
to meet the government's optimum requirements.
SOURCE: [Ref. 21: pp. 2-3]
2. Defining Minor Modification
The second issue is defining minor modification. As more and larger
modifications are demanded, the intended benefits of an NDI acquisition rapidly
disappear and the eventual cost savings are lost [Ref. 14: p. 4]. Many respondents
believed there was no clear regulatory definition of what constituted "minor
modification." In DFARS Subpart 211.7, minor modification is defined for commercial
items as: "a modification that does not alter the performance or physical characteristics
of the item" [Ref. 10: 211.7001]. Commercial items are only a part of the NDI
spectrum as illustrated by the archetypal model (Appendix B). The nature or scope of
a modification effort is the real problem. Many interviewees believed that "minor"
meant slightly or less seriously needed changes. Many interviewees believed that a
minor modification should be cost-effective, essentially needed, and within scope. The
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purpose of "in scope" is to ensure that the modification is needed and does not exceed
the Government's requirements. Therefore, the objective is to enhance the inherent
performance capabilities of an already existing commercial product to meet all of the
user's valid and essential requirements. Some respondents believed that an NDI strategy
should exploit developmental work already performed by others either through direct
adoption or by modification of existing products or technologies. Furthermore, if a
modification changes the inherent characteristics of an existing item, then the
modification is not minor. The intent is not to prohibit modifications, but ensure that
such changes are sensible and cost-effective. The scope of the modification should not
exceed the Government's requirements. A nondevelopmental item acquisition should
meet its requirements at the lowest estimated life-cycle cost [Ref. 15: p. 2-4].
3. Managing Technology Insertion Effectively
There is increasing concern over effectively managing the significant cost
driver—rapidly changing technologies. It was noted by interviewees that our inability to
manage technology insertion was trapping us into a world of technology obsolescence.
The key is to continuously monitor the "investments opportunities" in all phases of the
acquisition life-cycle. The highest short-term payoff results from inserting technology
in a mature system's components and spares [Ref. 2: p. 5]. The primary function of
technology insertion (TI) is to reduce operating and support costs at the component or
subassembly level. The goal of TI is to reduce serviceability costs by utilizing state-of-
the-art technology, to replace older, less reliable, and more costly technology [Ref. 2:
p. 5]. The technological investment must yield a higher net return. The growing
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concern is that we are not controlling the "investment decisions" effectively [Ref. 3: p.
3]. The Government is becoming trapped in a technology push relationship whereby
rapidly changing technologies are being inserted without any clear understanding of the
return value [Ref. 45: p. 45]. Many interviewees believed that up-front acquisition
planning and detailed market research are needed to effectively manage technology
insertion. It is important to further reduce life-cycle costs while maintaining base levels
of needed items. Value engineering, testing, and technology insertion are critical cost
reduction measures to sustain nondevelopmental items [Ref. 2: p. 5].
D. THE LIMITATIONS OF USING TWO-STEP SEALED BIDDING
1. Reviewing the Best-Value Concept
The third major issue is challenging the perception that best value and two-
step sealed bidding are mutually exclusive. This was the position of the majority of
interviewees. Also, this contention is the focal point of this research. The following
features characterize the best value acquisition process.
• past performance history
• life-cycle costing
• contractor's ability to successfully manage risk
• supportability
• reliability and maintainability of the product
• certification of contractors as preferred suppliers
• inclusion of a price differential factor in source selections for high quality products
[Ref. 24: p. 12].
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Overall, the best-value decision is based on assessing long-term worth instead of the
short-term acquisition price [Ref. 24: p. 12]. Best value is an integrated process and not
a one-time event. The requirements definition is an integral, but sometimes overlooked,
step in the best value process [Ref. 24: p. 13]. The evaluation factors are the backbone
of the source selection process. The evaluation criteria must be properly identified and
appropriately weighted [Ref. 24: p. 13]. Evaluation criteria are uniquely tailored to each
procurement. Typical criteria include quality-related factors such as reliability and
maintainability. Lastly, the award decision is based upon a tradeoff assessment when
considering price and performance differentials between competing offerors. The
resulting value judgment must be rational and the thought process consistent to withstand
any protest [Ref. 51: p. 13].
Today's best-value approach is a synthesis of past forms. In looking at the
major features of best-value contracting, two-step has inherent aspects of best value but
not all of them because of regulatory impediments. Two-step can substitute life-cycle
cost for price as the decision criterion [Ref. 40: p. 230]. Though expressed in terms of
dollars, this long-term measure goes beyond the acquisition "sticker" price. Another
important feature is the use of bid samples to demonstrate the characteristics of the
product offered in a bid [Ref. 20: 14.202-4]. Bid samples are used to determine the
responsiveness of the bid. As a product-like qualification measure, the physical
demonstration of the product can, in part, show the likelihood of successful performance.
The net effect is to reduce risk. Finally, the evaluation criteria use many quality-related
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factors such as reliability, maintainability, and safety [Ref. 15: p. 3-6]. Although
somewhat limited, the concept of best value can apply to two-step sealed bidding.
2. Exploring the Shortfalls of Two-Step
As mentioned before, many respondents felt that best value and two-step
sealed bidding are mutually exclusive. Further, most interviewees believed these
methods were mutually exclusive because they fundamentally differ in how to choose the
winning proposal. Specifically, two-step can only award a contract to the lowest priced
offeror [Ref. 20: 14.407-1]. On the other hand, the award basis for negotiated
procurements selects the proposal that offers the greatest value to the Government
considering price and non-price factors [Ref. 20: 15.605(b)(c)]. In addition, two-step
cannot award a contract to a higher priced offeror or consider differences in prices based
on quality differentiation. Unlike best-value contracting, many interviewees believed that
two-step had no flexibility to determine which proposal was more acceptable than
another. In other words, a technically superior proposal in step one carries no additional
weight in step two. Two-step cannot evaluate requirements that exceed the minimum
standards of acceptability [Ref. 20: 14.503- 1(c)(2)]. On the other hand, best-value
contracting has the inherent flexibility to determine if additional features of a proposal
are worth the extra cost [Ref. 21: p. 1]. In addition, best-value contracting can consider
a gamut of factors and ultimately make a judgmental comparison.
The evaluation and use of past performance is another shortfall. Under two-
step sealed bidding, the evaluation of past performance is confined to a responsibility
determination, while best-value contracting uses past performance as a separate non-price
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factor for determining contract award [Ref. 44: p. 88]. In FAR 9.104-1, the regulatory
language conflicts with the concept of giving a preference to suppliers based on superior
performance. The concept of "responsibility" does not support a form of supplier
"prequalification" at all, let alone one based on excellent, rather than merely satisfactory,
past performance [Ref. 44: p. 88].
It is important to realize that price-only awards are still valid for some types
of acquisitions. However, the budget realities of our acquisition process are steadily
changing the focus towards minimizing life-cycle costs [Ref. 23: p. 51]. As the
Government continues to advance towards a more integrated acquisition process, best
value will also continue to shape all facets of Government contracting. Therefore, the
benefits of best-value contracting are most effectively achieved using life-cycle costing
[Ref. 24: p. 14]. Current governmental regulations do not provide the required
integration of best-value contracting policies and procedures [Ref. 24: p. 14].
Ultimately, the objectives of meeting user's requirements and receiving best value are
the same [Ref. 15: p. 2-1].
E. THE UNION OF BEST VALUE AND TWO-STEP SEALED BIDDING
The perception that "best value" and two-step sealed bidding are mutually exclusive
has been the focus of this research. It appears that a valid argument can be made that
two-step can promote a value-based approach. The goal is not to create a perfect match
with that of best-value contracting, but rather to foster the viewpoint that the best-value
concept is not inclusive to competitively negotiated procurements. A two-step method
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can embrace the concept of best value. By doing so, a two-step process becomes a de
facto best value source selection. The following Venn Diagram conceptually outlines the
research model.
Table 7




SOURCE: Developed By Researcher
The shaded area depicts the overlapping ideas between each method. Based
on the research so far, it is not unreasonable to deduce that best value and two-step
procurements are interrelated. More importantly, two-step could be a viable alternative
for expanding the role of best value and NDI procurements. Two-step has been a
common method of procurement for nondevelopmental items. Two-step is best suited
for those nondevelopmental items that are "off-the-shelf and those requiring "minor
modification" [Ref. 15: p. 5-4]. Life-cycle cost is as important in NDI decisions as it
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is in all acquisition strategies. In considering alternatives, an NDI product should be
selected that has the lowest estimated life-cycle costs and meets essential requirements
[Ref. 5: p. 2-5]. Two-step sealed bidding can use life-cycle costing. As budget realities
steadily shift our focus towards minimizing life-cycle costs, two-step will become a
viable alternative for acquiring nondevelopmental items in the future.
NDI acquisition efforts are inherently geared to selecting products based on
many factors including price [Ref. 15: p. 2-1]. There is no truly single approach to best-
value contracting. Best value is an "affordable excellence" strategy. It can apply to any
acquisition that has recognized value to the Government in terms of quality or suitability.
The goal of best value is to find an equilibrium between the perceived value offered and
the price asked by either increasing the former or by reducing the latter. A best-value
decision is based on the assessment of long-term worth to the Government [Ref. 6: p.
17]. A best-value decision is not restricted to either the highest priced offeror or
necessarily the lowest priced offeror [Ref. 51: p. 1]. Consequently, each procurement
has the option to focus on either the acquisition price or total cost of ownership. By its
nature, best value can be applied to procurements using two-step sealed bidding.
Cost of ownership is related to best value because life-cycle cost is a measure
of value [Ref. 5: p. 6]. A best-value methodology focuses on minimizing discounted
life-cycle costs, not the acquisition price as the relevant cost measure [Ref. 35: p. 31].
Ownership costs and dependable quality are important aspects to the Government's
practice of best-value contracting. As the Packard Commission suggested, the
Government was moving in the right direction to establish guidance on how to measure
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best value by using life-cycle costing [Ref. 44: p. 92]. It is logical to deduce that life-
cycle costing is a form of best value. Life-cycle costing is crucial for the successful use
of best value [Ref. 24: p. 2], Then, two-step has an inherent form of best value—life-
cycle cost. In this manner, two-step allows a pre-stated, non-price factor to influence
source selection. Life-cycle cost is substituted for price as the decision criterion [Ref.
40: p. 230]. As a result, the criterion for contract award is no longer just price [Ref.
40: p. 239]. In essence, a two-step procurement arrives at a decision that is "most
beneficial" to the Government in terms of offering the lowest estimated total cost of
ownership. Initially, it might not be the cheapest, but it is the least expensive over the
product's life-cycle. Two-step can use other price-related factors to expand the award
decision criteria beyond the initial contract price. Commercial warranty costs and life-
cycle costs are two important examples. In this case, life-cycle cost ends "the practice
of awarding business on the basis of price tag only" [Ref. 23: p. 53].
Under negotiated and two-step procurements, the award decision is based on
the "most advantageous" procurement to the Government. The objective of best value
is to select the proposal that is "most advantageous" to the Government [Ref. 57: p. 29].
The similarity of language implies that both procurement methods have a value-based
decision. As suggested, the commonality of regulatory language indicates that lawmakers
envisioned a greater utility for best value. As Deming remarked, "price has no meaning
without a measure of quality being purchased" [Ref. 34: p. 17]. Product reliability and
maintainability are important evaluation factors in a best-value determination [Ref. 24:
p. 12]. These factors are quality-related measures [Ref. 10: 246.103]. Likewise, these
82
quality factors are crucial to the technical evaluation process of two-step [Ref. 16: p. 6-
P-l]. Technical acceptability is based on conformity to the technical requirements
contained in the solicitation. Conformity relates to quality which can be defined as
"conformance to correctly defined requirements and satisfying customer needs" [Ref. 34:
p. 24]. In this context, acceptability is related to both technical and quality factors. In
other words, quality is inherent to a two-step method. Two-step has flexibility to
incorporate quality and other factors into the evaluation process.
Another feature of best-value contracting is the contractor's ability to
successfully manage risk [Ref. 24: p. 12]. Under two-step, the use of bid samples helps
to reduce concerns about contractor performance. Bid samples are used to demonstrate
the characteristics of the product being offered in a bid [Ref. 20: 14.202-4]. Bid samples
are used to determine the responsiveness of the bid. As a product-like qualification
measure, the physical demonstration of the product can, in part, show the likelihood of
successful performance. Best-value contracting also encourages giving a preference to
suppliers based on superior performance [Ref. 24: p. 12]. Under two-step, the notion
of "prequalification" is not the same as in best-value contracting. That is, the first step
is a "filtering out process" which eliminates unqualified offerors. Consequently, only
qualified offerors can participate in the second step. As Deming stated, the inherent
difficulty in a best-value process is to define the needed level of quality or value [Ref.
34: p. 16]. Two-step must have the requirements defined in a manner that precludes the
acquisition of products that are of such poor quality that they could not meet the essential
requirements. As mentioned, best value is a compilation of value-based techniques to
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determine the most advantageous procurement. Two-step can also produce a value-based
procurement decision whereby the product outcome is most beneficial in terms of
achieving greater long-term worth. It is true that two-step cannot award a contract to a
higher priced offeror or consider differences in prices based on quality differentiation.
In essence, best value can be applied to a two-step procurement method.
F. SUMMARY
Best value is neither clearly defined nor is it explicitly limited to negotiated
procurements. An operational definition seems to be needed in the FAR. The
effectiveness of NDI procurements need to be more closely monitored because many
Service procurement efforts are likely to concentrate on more difficult and "not yet
available" items. The legislative intent for the preference of NDI products should be
readdressed. The scope and meaning of "minor modification" needs clarification. Two-
step sealed bidding is somewhat restricted by regulatory guidelines; however, there are
many aspects of best value inherent to a two-step method. The implementation of best
value has not yet achieved its full potential in the Government contracting arena [Ref.
24: p. 15]. Best value will likely affect all procurement methodologies in the future.
Finally, two-step has not reached its optimal utility. Chapter V highlights a two-step
model for getting best value in NDI procurements.
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE BEST-VALUE APPROACH
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes a two-step model for getting best value in NDI
procurements. Two-step sealed bidding is a viable alternative for expanding the best-
value concept and NDI acquisitions. NDI acquisitions are inherently geared to best value
source selections [Ref. 15: p. 2-1]. In the past, two-step was a common procurement
method for acquiring nondevelopmental items. Lately, two-step has fallen into disuse
because of the popularity of best-value contracting. Two-step has more flexibility than
one would perceive. Two-step sealed bidding and best-value contracting are not mutually
exclusive. Though functionally different, two-step can implement an alternative best-
value approach while not displacing its "price-only" award basis.
B. A DESCRIPTION OF THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
This two-step model is a compilation of value-based techniques to determine the
most advantageous procurement. Two-step can foster a value-based approach. The
following aspects highlight this alternative best-value acquisition process:
• life-cycle costing
• quality-based evaluation factors
• compliant bid samples
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These features function within a conventional two-step process. Each aspect adds value
to the award decision process. The heart of this alternative model is life-cycle costing.
LCC is a measure of value and an integral part of best-value contracting [Ref. 5: p. 6].
A best-value methodology focuses on minimizing life-cycle costs [Ref. 35: p. 31]. Two-
step has an inherent form of best value-life-cycle cost. Two-step substitutes LCC for
price as the decision criterion [Ref. 40: p. 230]. The criterion for contract award is no
longer price. Instead, it measures the total cost of ownership of a product over its useful
life. As Deming described, it ends "the practice of awarding business on the basis of
price tag only" [Ref. 23: p. 53].
This alternative model also uses quality-based evaluation factors in a two-step
process. Best-value contracting emphasizes reliability and maintainability [Ref. 24: p.
12]. Likewise, these factors are crucial in the technical evaluation process of two-step.
These evaluation factors are quality-related considerations [Ref. 10: 246.103].
Furthermore, technical acceptability is based on "conformity" to the requirements.
Conformity is, in part, a function of quality which adds value to the overall two-step
process.
Finally, this alternative approach maximizes the use of bid samples. Best-value
contracting measures the likelihood of successful performance or risk [Ref. 24: p. 12].
Under a two-step method, bid samples help to better gauge the likelihood of successful
performance. A bid sample is similar to a product-like qualification measure. The
physical demonstration of the sample can, in part, indicate the likelihood of successful
performance. In other words, the physical demonstration reduces risk concerns about
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a contractor's ability to produce the item even though its primary function is to determine
responsiveness. In essence, these aspects highlight the thrust of this alternative best-
value approach. An overview of this model is contained in the latter part of this chapter.
There are potential modifications that could greatly improve this alternative approach to
better resemble a best-value process which are discussed in a subsequent section.
C. THE COMMONALITY OF BEST VALUE
Although best-value contracting and two-step sealed bidding are not the same, the
concept of best value is common to both procurement methods. Best-value contracting
is a synthesis of past forms [Ref. 39: p. 33]. The concept of best value can be applied
to any acquisition that has recognized value to the Government in terms of quality or
suitability. A best-value decision is based on the assessment of long-term worth to the
Government [Ref. 6: p. 17]. A best-value procurement can focus on either the
acquisition price or total cost of ownership. Importantly, cost of ownership is related to
best value.
As the Packard Commission suggested, LCC was an important stepping stone in
establishing guidance on how to measure best value [Ref. 44: p. 92]. CODSIA also
indicated that life-cycle costing should be related to best value [Ref. 5: p. 6]. As
described, LCC is the heart of this alternative best-value approach. It is logical to
deduce that LCC is a form of best value. Similarly, two-step can use an inherent form
of best value—life-cycle cost.
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Under negotiated and two-step procurements, the award decision is based on the
"most advantageous" procurement to the Government. The objective of best value is to
select the proposal that is most advantageous to the Government [Ref. 57: p. 29]. The
similarity of language implies that both procurement methods have a value-based
decision. As suggested, the commonality of language indicates that lawmakers
envisioned a greater utility for best value, and this rationale is why the concept of best
value can be applied to a two-step process. Ultimately, two-step can achieve a value-
based award decision that is most beneficial to the Government in terms of achieving
long-term worth.
D. IMPEDIMENTS
As mentioned earlier, two-step cannot truly replace a conventional RFP best-value
approach. Essentially, three significant shortfalls exist in a two-step method:
• evaluation and use of past performance
• certification of contractors as preferred suppliers
• inclusion of a price differential factor in source selections for high quality products.
The evaluation of past performance, under a two-step method, is confined to a
responsibility determination, while best-value contracting uses past performance as a
separate non-price factor for determining contract award [Ref. 44: p. 88]. In FAR
9.104-1, the regulatory language conflicts with the concept of giving a preference to
suppliers based on superior performance. The concept of "responsibility" does not
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support a form of "supplier" prequalification at all, let alone one based on excellent,
rather than merely satisfactory, past performance [Ref. 44: p. 88]. Also, two-step must
award a contract to the lowest priced, technically acceptable offeror [Ref. 20: 14.407-1].
The award decision is restricted to considering only "price and price-related" factors
[Ref. 20: 14. 103-2(d)]. More importantly, two-step cannot award a contract to a higher
priced offeror or consider differences in prices based on quality differentiation. Unlike
best-value contracting, a technically superior proposal in step one carries no additional
weight in step two. In addition, two-step cannot evaluate requirements that exceed the
minimum standards of acceptability [Ref. 20: 14.503-l(c)(2)]. Best-value contracting has
the flexibility to determine if additional features of a proposal are worth the extra cost
[Ref. 21: p. 1].
E. CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE
Two-step is a viable method for expanding the role of best value and NDI
acquisitions. Two-step can foster a value-based approach. As shown, the concept of
best value can be applied to a two-step process. Although two-step lacks the
"judgmental" flexibility of best-value contracting, it does have a value-based procurement
decision. In comparison, best-value contracting enhances the discretionary "choice" of
the Government, but it also weakens the auditability and verifiability of the source
selection process [Ref. 39: p. 34]. On the other hand, two-step has less discretionary
choice, but it can strengthen the verifiability of the source selection process. Two-step
strives to reduce the intangibles or judgmental areas by quantifying them to the maximum
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extent possible. As described, two-step can use a life-cycle cost structure which is
quantifiable and a measure of long-term worth.
In using this alternative two-step model, it does not appear feasible or practical to
create a mathematical formula that could enable the Government to tradeoff price and
technical differences. For example, if Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) is the
central cost factor, then the task is to ascertain the value of one hour of MTBF to
exercise a tradeoff analysis. It is too difficult to derive this pre-determined common
measure of value. Many respondents also suggested assigning a pre-determined
weighting scheme between price and technical considerations so that the Government
could make tradeoff decisions. Likewise, this suggestion creates a process that appears
to be too subjective and difficult to determine.
A decade ago, governmental agencies commonly used explicit mathematical
formulas to balance cost and technical quality—formulas that translate bid costs into
points for a proposal [Ref. 39: p. 33]. The consequence was:
Many agencies felt stymied by a system that effectively paid dollars for technical
points without consideration of the underlying significance of the technical points
[Ref. 39: p. 33].
In other words, an explicit mathematical formula did not work effectively because of the
inherent subjectivity and difficulty in applying it consistently [Ref. 39: p. 33].
A two-step process can balance price and value in a manner that does not
complicate the process. The key is to use life-cycle costing. LCC can enable the
Government to take advantage of a proposal with design features exceeding the essential
requirements because the bidder's total cost of ownership might be furtner reduced as a
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consequence of having these additional features [Ref. 36: p. 12]. In such cases, the
contractor is incentivized not to remove any additional features because the criterion for
contract award is no longer just price. Furthermore, LCC eliminates the need for a price
differential factor because the Government can achieve greater cost savings in terms of
long-term worth.
In looking at a two-step process, there are many unrealized advantages that two-
step can offer. It is more verifiable and auditable than a competitively negotiated best-
value procurement because two-step can use a more quantifiable and objective approach—
life-cycle costing. A properly planned two-step takes no more time than a typical best-
value acquisition. By using compliant bid samples, no first article test is required. Two-
step ensures an NDI product conforms to the technical requirements. A two-step process
forces the use of a meaningful "market analysis." Finally, it is a disciplined process that
protects the Government against poor quality and reduces the likelihood of "gold-
plating," cost increases, and schedule slips.
F. POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS
The two-step model is a viable alternative for expanding the domain of best value.
As described earlier, this alternative approach lacks three key characteristics of best-value
contracting: (1) past performance, (2) certified preferred suppliers, and (3) price
differential factor. Potential modifications exist that could greatly improve this
alternative model to better resemble a best-value process. Four modifications to improve
this two-step model are presented below.
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First, two-step uses bid samples to determine "responsiveness." The physical
demonstration of the product can, in part, indicate the likelihood of successful
performance. The net effect reduces risk concerns about the contractor; however, the
Government cannot use bid samples to evaluate a bidder's ability to produce the required
item [Ref. 20: 14. 202 -4(b)(2)]. It is difficult to evaluate only "responsiveness" when the
Government has a sample that could also function as a physical demonstration of the
bidder's ability to produce the item. These requirements are hard to separate. It is in
the Government's interest to have the flexibility to make a reasonable determination on
both matters, especially in NDI production contracts. It seems beneficial to establish a
waiver process so that the Government could consider both requirements in a
determination of responsiveness. The objective is not to undermine the concept of
responsiveness or responsibility, but to facilitate the assessment of risk and better indicate
the likelihood of successful performance.
A second modification is to implement a "Qualified Bidders List." Unlike best-
value contracting, a two-step method is not authorized to use a supplier prequalification
process [Ref. 44: p. 89]. The Packard Commission recommended the following solution:
One possible approach would be to enact a statutory provision-perhaps in the same
statute establishing a "preference" for commercial procurement—making it clear
that DOD is authorized to implement prequalification requirements as part of the
comprehensive commercial procurement system mandated by the statute,
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" [Ref. 44: p. 90].
In other words, DOD should request that Congress enact a statutory provision in the NDI
Preference Act to authorize the use of supplier prequalification in both sealed bidding and
negotiated procurements for solely acquiring NDI items [Ref. 44: p. 90]. This supplier
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prequalification process would not restrict full and open competition. It simply precludes
poor quality contractors from bidding unless qualification or acceptability of meeting
essential requirements could be determined beforehand. In this manner, the statutory
provision enhances the acquisition of nondevelopmental items and two-step without
changing the legislative scope of CICA.
A third modification which could greatly improve this alternative best-value
approach is to allow the two-step process to result in a fixed-price-award- fee (FPAF)
contract. It is a value-based contracting technique that offers unique opportunities for
the Government not only to get the type of contractor wanted but also the type of
performance really desired [Ref. 42: p. 16]. In Subpart 14.5, two-step may use either
a firm-fixed-price contract or a fixed-price contract with economic price adjustment [Ref.
20: 14.502(a)(5)]. A FAR deviation could be granted because Subpart 14.5 does not
explicitly exclude it. The FAR allows for deviations of contract types under Subpart 1.4
[Ref. 2: p. 2-9]. As noted, a request for a FAR deviation is a useful way to develop and
test new techniques or methods [Ref. 20: 1.402]. The Air Force has developed and
tested an FPAF contract type [Ref. 42: p. 16]. A FPAF contract appears suitable for
two-step NDI procurements because it requires a contractor to perform on a fixed-price
basis with "award" of a variable "fee" to be determined at the sole direction of an award
determination board in response to the quality of work performed [Ref. 2: p. 2-7], A
FPAF contract could be extremely beneficial to a two-step procurement because the
Government has greater flexibility to determine which evaluation factors to use, and how
to sufficiently motivate contractor performance.
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The fourth and last modification is to develop a return-on-investment (ROI) factor
to be used as a "price-related" factor in a two-step method. The purpose of this factor
is to enable the Government to give an evaluation preference (e.g. 10%) to a bidder for
having a particular "technology enhancement" that could provide significant long-term
cost savings to the Government. It is an investment opportunity decision or differential
to help better manage technology insertion for NDI acquisitions. In this manner, long-
term cost savings could be encouraged, even at the expense of paying a higher overall
acquisition price. Further research is necessary to determine if this idea is practical or
feasible.
G. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ALTERNATIVE BEST-VALUE MODEL
As mentioned, the alternative model integrates the concept of best value into a two-
step process. The overall approach is a compilation of value-based techniques to
determine the most advantageous procurement. This overview also includes two
previously discussed potential modifications to better illustrate the dynamics and viability
of this alternative approach. The overall structure of this model contains the following
characteristics:
• life-cycle costing
• quality-based evaluation factors
• compliant bid samples
• qualified bidders list
• fixed-price-award-fee contract
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The procurement model functions within a conventional two-step method. As
mentioned, there are two modifications added which strengthen the integration of a best-
value concept: (1) prequalification and (2) fixed-price-award-fee contract. Similar to a
best-value determination, the first step focuses on product reliability and maintainability
[Ref. 16: p. 6-P-l]. These evaluation factors are quality-related considerations [Ref. 10:
246.103]. Quality is defined as "conformance to correctly defined requirements and
satisfying customer needs" [Ref. 34: p. 24]. In this context, quality is an essential part
of the technical evaluation process.
The notion of "prequalification" is different in two-step than in best-value
contracting which can certify contractors as "preferred" suppliers. Under a two-step
method, the first step is a "filtering out process," which eliminates unqualified offerors
in step one. In other words, unqualified offerors cannot participate in step two. As
noted, this model would establish a supplier prequalification requirement or a "Qualified
Bidders List." As discussed, this is based on the enactment of a statutory provision in
the 1987 NDI Preference Act that authorizes only DOD to implement such a requirement
in sealed bid and competitive proposal procurements [Ref. 44: p. 90]. This statutory
provision is solely for acquiring nondevelopmental items. In this regard, the enactment
enhances the acquisition of nondevelopmental items and two-step without changing the
legislative scope of CICA and competition.
Another facet of this de facto best-value process is to use compliant bid samples.
Bid samples are used as a requirement in step one for determining "responsiveness" [Ref.
20: 14.202-4(b)(2)]. Best value tries to select the proposal that offers the greatest
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promise or likelihood of successfully meeting identified needs [Ref. 48: p. 4-4]. The
utility of bid samples is that they require contractors to physically demonstrate the
product up-front in the acquisition process. A bid sample functions as a product-like
qualification measure. Bid samples can reduce risk concerns about a contractor's ability
to produce the product, and in the proposed alternative method, bid samples would be
used to evaluate a bidder's ability to produce the required item. It is important to realize
that bid samples add value to the overall process because the product has to be physically
demonstrated up-front.
The key feature of this alternative approach is life-cycle costing. Often times, a
two-step method does not exploit the potential advantages of using "price-related" factors
to expand the basis for contract award. LCC is the heart of this two-step process which
is also an integral aspect of best-value contracting. As described, it is a measure of long-
term worth that is also an inherent form of best value. LCC allows the Government in
step two to consider potential cost savings from selecting the offeror who has the lowest
total cost of ownership. This quantifiable technique is suitable for a wide range of
products including nondevelopmental items.
Life-cycle cost is substituted for price as the decision criterion [Ref. 40: p. 230].
As a result, the criterion for contract award is no longer just price. In this manner, two-
step allows a pre-stated, non-price factor to influence the source selection [Ref. 40: p.
230]. Initially, a LCC award might not be the cheapest, but it is the least expensive over
the life-span of a product. In essence, life-cycle costing results in a procurement award
decision that is "most beneficial" to the Government in terms of offering the lowest
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estimated life-cycle cost. LCC is advantageous to use because the Government can
consider additional features which might or could further reduce a contractor's overall
life-cycle cost. Such features include improvements to MTBF statistics. Consequently,
a contractor has an incentive to retain additional features exceeding the minimum
requirements [Ref. 36: p. 12].
As developed, this model would also use a fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF) contract
which would require a FAR amendment or deviation. An FPAF arrangement is a value-
based contracting technique which appears suitable for NDI production-related contracts.
However, the dollar-value of the acquisition must be high enough to offset the
administrative costs associated with administering an award-fee contract.
A FPAF contract could significantly improve this overall value-based approach.
It gives the Government greater flexibility in a two-step process by allowing the
Government more latitude to influence the quality of effort being performed. The key
is for the Government to choose the criteria and ensure such factors are sufficient enough
to motivate contractor performance. An award-fee structure tends to favor higher quality
contractors [Ref. 2: p. 2-8]. In essence, this model is comprised of value-based
techniques. Together, these features add value to a two-step procurement award
decision. Although these characteristics are not the same as those in best-value
contracting, they do realistically implement an alternative best-value approach.
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H. SUMMARY
Best-value contracting and two-step sealed bidding are not the same. In light of
the evidence presented in this research, the concept of best value can be applied to two-
step. Even though two-step lacks the "judgmental" flexibility of best-value contracting,
it does have a value-based procurement decision in which the outcome is most beneficial
to the Government in terms of achieving greater long-term worth. A dichotomy can exist
within the concept of best value. Though functionally different, two-step has an inherent
form of best value. The following features summarize this functionally different but
form of best value:
• life-cycle costing
• quality-based evaluation factors
• compliant bid samples
• qualified bidders list
• fixed-price-award-fee contract
As the researcher has attempted to demonstrate, the concept of best value can cover
a broader scope than perceived. As described, a best-value decision is based on long-
term worth. A best-value procurement can focus on either the acquisition price or total
cost of ownership. By its nature, the concept of best value appears adaptable to other
procurement methods, such as two-step. Two-step is a viable procurement method for
acquiring nondevelopmental items. Even though it has not been fully utilized, two-step
is a marketable tool for DOD to acquire nondevelopmental items in a cost beneficial
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manner. More flexibility exists in two-step than one perceives. A two-step approach can
be characterized as a net-value approach that can use a best-value concept. The next
chapter summarizes the conclusions and recommendations of this research.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes the conclusions and recommendations of this research.
Chapter VI contains four major parts: conclusions, recommendations, answers to
research questions, and areas for further research. First, the conclusions address
regulatory, practical, and legal issues involving best-value contracting, nondevelopmental
item acquisition, and two-step sealed bidding. Next, important recommendations are
presented which address the fundamental problems or issues disclosed by the research.
Thirdly, the researcher provides answers to the proposed research questions of this study.
Finally, the researcher suggests potential areas for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. The Government lacks clear regulatory guidance on how to measure best
value.
No standard or operational definition of best value exists in the FAR or
DFARS. The current practice of best value has manifested from Subpart 15.6 in the
FAR. This subpart describes the Government's official policy on source selection in
competitively negotiated procurements. The FAR does not provide explicit regulatory
guidance on how to measure best value; it simply encourages the use of best-value
contracting. The FAR states that "the Government may select the source whose proposal
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offers the greatest value to the Government in terms of performance and other factors"
[Ref. 20: 15.605(c)]. The current regulatory guidance relies upon the skill and judgment
of contracting officers to effectively implement this concept.
2. The best-value process should be formalized.
Many respondents agreed that the process was too subjective to remain
unchecked by the Government. Many practical and legal issues are not adequately
addressed. For example, Government and contractor "gaming" create an unfair playing
field for all participants. The credibility of evaluating contractor past performance as
well as inconsistent decisions by the Source Selection Authority are raising further
concerns. Also, improper identification and inconsistent use of evaluation factors
increase the probability of error and invite protests. The real issue is not to emplace a
regulatory constriction on the process, but rather ensure the Government uses the process
wisely.
3. "Best value" is not a new concept.
Many interviewees said that the concept of best value was not new. Its robust
form evolved over time from major systems acquisition. In the past, systems acquisition
typically involved a complex ranking and evaluation of objective and subjective factors.
Today, best-value contracting is a spin-off of the classical commercial buying objective.
Like any buyer, the Government also wants "value" for its purchase dollar. Best-value
contracting is a value-based approach. Best value shifted from a formulaic process into
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a more flexible, yet structured, approach that resembled the thought process of an
average consumer.
4. Best value is not limited to competitively negotiated procurements.
Although best-value contracting and two-step sealed bidding are not the same,
the concept of best value is common to both procurement methods. Best-value
contracting is a synthesis of past forms. The concept of best value can be applied to any
acquisition that has recognized value to the Government in terms of quality or suitability.
A best-value decision is based on the assessment of long-term worth to the Government.
Further, the award decision is not restricted to either the highest priced offeror or
necessarily the lowest priced offeror. A best-value procurement can focus on either the
acquisition price or total cost of ownership. Therefore, cost of ownership is related to
best value.
As the Packard Commission suggested, LCC was an important stepping stone
in establishing guidance on how to measure best value. CODSIA also indicated that life-
cycle costing should be related to best value. LCC is the key in demonstrating that the
concept of best value can be applied to a two-step process. It is logical to deduce that
LCC is a form of best value. Similarly, two-step can use an inherent form of best value-
-life-cycle cost. Under negotiated and two-step procurements, the award decision is
based on the "most advantageous" procurement to the Government. The objective of best
value is to select the proposal that is most advantageous to the Government. The
similarity of language implies that both procurement methods have a value-based
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decision. As suggested, the commonality of language indicates that lawmakers
envisioned a greater utility for the concept of best value.
5. Although NDI is clearly defined by law, much ambiguity exists in regards
to the true meaning of "nondevelopmental."
The underlying objective of an NDI acquisition is to minimize or eliminate
the need for costly, time-consuming, Government-sponsored research and development
programs. While conceptually sound, current practices in acquiring nondevelopmental
items have been flawed. In some cases, the Defense Department has characterized
procurements as "nondevelopmental" when no commercially available products actually
exist. "Nondevelopmental" is not intended to be an oxymoron. It means "not requiring
development," but it does not preclude the possible requirement of Government-funded
development. A nondevelopmental item acquisition focuses on solving a sub-optimization
problem. The goal is to choose an existing commercial product that best meets our
needs, even though it may not meet all of the requirements, but could if the Government
funds the minimal development needed.
6. No clear regulatory definition exists or clarifies what constitutes a
"minor modification" in NDI acquisitions.
Minor modification is referenced in the 1987 NDI Preference Act, but its
regulatory meaning is missing. Minor modification is defined in the DFARS Subpart
211.7 for commercial items but not for the NDI spectrum. Many respondents believed
that "minor" meant slightly or less seriously needed changes. Further, they felt that a
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minor modification should be cost-effective, essentially needed, and within scope. The
purpose of "in scope" is to ensure that a modification is cost-beneficial and does not
exceed the Government's essential requirements. In essence, a minor modification
enhances the inherent performance capabilities of an already existing commercial product
to meet the Government's essential requirements while not significantly altering the
physical characteristics of an item.
7. Our inability to manage technology insertion is decreasing DOD's ability
to effectively acquire nondevelopmental items.
DOD is not effectively managing the significant cost driver-rapidly changing
technologies. The key is to continuously monitor the "investment opportunities" existing
in all phases of the acquisition life-cycle. The goal of technology insertion is to reduce
serviceability costs by utilizing state-of-the-art technology, to replace older, less reliable,
and more costly technology. The highest payoff is to insert new technology in a mature
system's components and spares. The growing concern is that we are not controlling the
investment decisions effectively. Consequently, the Government traps itself in a
technology-push relationship whereby rapidly changing technologies are inserted without
any clear understanding of the return value.
8. Best value and two-step sealed bidding are not mutually exclusive. Two-
step has inherent aspects of best value.
The concept of best value can be applied to two-step sealed bidding. Even
though two-step lacks the "judgmental flexibility" of best-value contracting, it does have
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a value-based procurement decision. A dichotomy can exist with the concept of best
value. Though functionally different, two-step has an inherent form of best value. The
following features summarize this functionally different but inherent form of best value:
• life-cycle costing
• quality-based evaluation factors
• compliant bid samples
These features function in a conventional two-step process. Each aspect adds
value to the award decision process. The heart of this inherent form of best value is life-
cycle costing. A best-value methodology focuses on minimizing life-cycle costs. Cost
of ownership is related to best value. LCC is an integral aspect of best-value
contracting. It is a measure of long-term worth that is also an inherent form of best
value. In essence, two-step has an inherent form of best value—life-cycle cost. Two-step
substitutes life-cycle cost for price as the decision criterion. The criterion for contract
award is no longer price. In this manner, two-step allows a pre-stated, non-price factor
to influence the source selection. LCC results in a procurement award decision that is
"most beneficial" to the Government in terms of offering the lowest estimated total cost
of ownership.
The second feature is using quality-based evaluation factors in a two-step
process. Best-value contracting emphasizes reliability and maintainability. Likewise,
these factors are just as important in the technical evaluation of two-step. These
evaluation factors are quality-related considerations. Technical acceptability is based on
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"conformity" to the requirements. Conformity is, in part, a function of quality which
adds value to the overall two-step process. In addition, the notion of "prequalification"
is different in two-step than in best-value contracting. The first step acts like a "filtering
out process," which eliminates unqualified offerors from the second step.
The final aspect is the value added from using bid samples. Best-value
contracting measures the likelihood of successful performance or risk. Under a two-step
method, bid samples help to better gauge the likelihood of successful performance. A
bid sample is similar to a product-like qualification measure. The physical demonstration
of the sample can, in part, indicate the likelihood of successful performance. In other
words, the physical demonstration reduces risk concerns about a contractor's ability to
produce the item even though its primary function is to determine responsiveness. These
aspects highlight the inherent characteristics of best value.
9. Regulatory impediments keep two-step sealed bidding from implementing
a truly best-value approach.
As mentioned earlier, two-step cannot truly implement a conventional RFP
best-value approach. Essentially, three significant shortfalls exist in a two-step method:
• the evaluation and use of past performance
• certification of contractors as preferred suppliers
• inclusion of a price differential factor in source selections for high quality products.
The evaluation of past performance, under a two-step method, is confined to a
responsibility determination, while best-value contracting uses past performance as a
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separate evaluation factor in the award process. In FAR Subpart 9. 104-1, the regulatory
language conflicts with the concept of giving a preference to suppliers based on superior
performance. Overall, the concept of responsibility does not support a form of
"supplier" prequalification at all, let alone one based on excellent, rather than merely
satisfactory, past performance. Also, two-step must award a contract to the lowest
priced, technically acceptable offeror. The award decision is restricted to considering
only "price and price-related factors." More importantly, two-step cannot award a
contract to a higher priced offeror or consider differences in prices based on quality
differentiation. Unlike best-value contracting, a technically superior proposal in step one
carries no additional weight than one that is marginally acceptable in step two. Two-step
cannot evaluate features that exceed the minimum standards of acceptability. On the
other hand, best-value contracting has the flexibility to determine if additional features
of a proposal are worth the extra cost.
10. In demonstrating an alternative best-value approach that uses a two-step
process, it is not feasible to create a formulaic methodology that could
enable the Government to tradeoff price and technical differences among
competing bidders.
In using a two-step approach, it is not feasible or practical to create a
mathematical formula that could enable the Government to tradeoff price and technical
differences among competing bidders. Many respondents suggested assigning a pre-
determined weighting scheme for price and technical differences so that the Government
could exercise a comparative tradeoff analysis. The problem is that this solution creates
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a process which is too subjective and difficult to use. In addition, this approach can
already be used in an RFP best-value procurement. In the past, Governmental Agencies
commonly used explicit mathematical formulas to balance cost and technical quality-
formulas that translated bid costs into points for a proposal. Consequently, the formulas
did not work effectively because of the inherent subjectivity and difficulty in applying
them consistently.
A two-step process can balance price and value in a manner that does not
complicate the process. The key is to use life-cycle costing. LCC can enable the
Government to take advantage of a proposal with design features exceeding the essential
requirements because the bidder's total cost of ownership might be further reduced as a
consequence of having these additional features. In such cases, the contractor is
incentivized not to remove any additional features because the criterion for contract
award is no longer just price. Furthermore, LCC eliminates the need for a price
differential factor because the Government can achieve greater cost savings in terms of
long-term worth.
11. Two-step sealed bidding is a viable procurement method for expanding
the role of best value and NDI procurements.
Two-step is a viable procurement method for expanding the domain of best
value and NDI acquisitions. Like best-value contracting, two-step can foster a value-
based approach. The concept of best value can be applied to a two-step process.
Although two-step lacks the judgmental flexibility of best-value contracting, it does have
a value-based procurement decision. Two-step has fallen into disuse; however, it is a
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viable tool for acquiring nondevelopmental items in a cost beneficial manner. More
flexibility exists in two-step than one may perceive. Two-step can capitalize on life-cycle
costing which is a long-term measure and an essential part of best-value contracting. As
Deming described, LCC ends "the practice of awarding business on the basis of price tag
only" [Ref. 23: p. 53].
Two-step has many unrealized advantages to offer in comparison to a
conventional RFP best-value approach. This alternative structure is more verifiable and
auditable than a best-value determination and, thus, it can easily withstand the challenges
of a bid protest. A properly planned two-step takes no more time than a negotiated best-
value procurement and, most likely, less time. By using a compliant bid sample
evaluation, no first article tests are required following contract award. A two-step
process ensures an NDI product conforms to the technical requirements. A less obvious
but significant advantage is that the process forces the use of a meaningful "market
analysis." Finally, two-step reduces the likelihood of "gold plating," cost growth, and
schedule slips. In essence, it is a very disciplined process that protects the Government
against poor quality while delivering acceptable products on-time and at the lowest
possible cost.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Government should adopt a standard definition and provide
procedural guidelines for measuring best value to facilitate and promote
uniformity and understanding of best value.
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There is no single approach to best-value contracting. A major concern is
how to measure best value. The FAR encourages its use but relies upon the skill and
judgment of contracting officers to effectively implement the concept of best value.
Many practical and legal issues remain clouded and unclear for procedural consistency.
The goal of a standard definition is not to emplace a regulatory constriction on the
process, but rather ensure the Government uses the process wisely. A suitable definition
to be further investigated is one suggested by CODSIA:
A best-value award is based on the Government's most advantageous acquisition
decision as determined through a disciplined approach that provides full
considerations of all requirements and resources specified in the solicitation [Ref.
49: p. 3].
Further, procedural guidelines addressing problem areas and how to measure best value
should be written and clearly delineated in DOD Instruction 5000.2, Part 10, "Selection
of Contractual Sources."
2. The Government should use a two-step method for obtaining best value
in NDI acquisitions.
The concept of best value can be applied to a two-step process. Two-step can
foster a value-based approach. Two-step lacks the judgmental flexibility of best-value
contracting, but it does have a value-based procurement decision in which the outcome
is most beneficial to the Government in terms of achieving greater long-term worth. A
best-value decision is based on long-term worth. A best-value procurement can focus on
a total cost of ownership. By its nature, the concept of best value is adaptable to a two-
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step process. Two-step has an inherent form of best value. The following features
summarize this functionally different but inherent form of best value:
• life-cycle costing
• quality-based evaluation factors
• compliant bid samples
• qualified bidders list
• fixed-price-award-fee contract
Two-step can balance price and value in a manner that does not complicate
the process. The key is to use life-cycle costing. LCC is a measure of long-term worth
and an integral part of best-value contracting. LCC measures the total cost of ownership
of a product over its useful life. LCC enables the Government to take advantage of a
proposal with design features exceeding the essential requirements because the bidder's
total cost of ownership might be further reduced as a consequence of having these
additional features. Two-step can use quality-based evaluation factors in the technical
evaluation. Quality becomes an essential part of the process. Two-step can also use bid
samples to better gauge the likelihood of successful performance. The physical
demonstration of the product reduces risk concerns about a contractor's ability to produce
the item even though its primary function is to determine responsiveness. In essence,
two-step is a viable procurement method for acquiring nondevelopmental items. It can
acquire NDI products in a cost beneficial manner. More flexibility exists in two-step
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than one perceives. Two-step is a dynamic process for getting best value in NDI
acquisitions.
3. DOD should revise Part Six of DOD Instruction 5000.2 to better clarify
the true meaning of "nondevelopmental."
"Nondevelopmental" is not intended to be an oxymoron, but current trends
and practices have flawed its implementation. Part Six of the DOD Instruction does not
adequately address the "true" intent of the NDI Preference Act. The following definition
should be added to Part Six:
When conducted correctly, an NDI should result in the Government's selection of
an existing item which, by either evaluation or testing, demonstrates the potential
to meet the user's optimum requirement with a minimum of subsequent
development, cost, schedule, or technical risk.
NDI is a sub-optimization strategy. The general guidelines highlighted in Chapter IV,
likewise, should be incorporated into the revision. These proposed changes are
consistent with the legislative intent of the NDI Preference Act.
4. DOD needs to clarify and accurately define the meaning and intent of
"minor modification."
There is no clear definition of "minor modification" in the Title 10 (Section
2325) Statute or in the DOD Instruction 5000.2. This lack of clarity is causing protest
and litigation problems. As more and larger modifications are demanded, the intended
benefits of an NDI acquisition rapidly disappear, and the eventual cost savings are lost.
As mentioned, DFARS Part 211.70, "Commercial Item," defines minor modification,
but the definition is not broad enough to cover the whole spectrum of an NDI. As many
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respondents described, an NDI strategy should exploit developmental work already
performed by others, either through direct adoption or by modification of existing
technologies. DOD Instruction 5000.2 and the NDI Preference Act should incorporate
the following definition:
Minor refers to slightly or less seriously needed changes. A minor modification,
like a requirement, should be cost-effective, essentially needed, and within scope.
The purpose of "in scope" is to ensure that the change is needed and does not
exceed the Government's requirements. Therefore, the objective is to enhance the
inherent performance capabilities or characteristics of an already existing
commercial product to meet all of the essential requirements.
5. DOD Instruction 5000.2, Part Six, should be revised to include a section
on managing and controlling technology insertion (TI).
As NDI acquisitions continue to increase, there is increasing concern over
effectively managing TI. The significant cost driver is rapidly changing commercial
technologies. Detailed market research and up-front acquisition planning are critical to
make the technology investment decision wisely. The Government must monitor
insertion opportunities continuously. The Government must have a clear understanding
of the return value before technology is inserted. The acquisition strategy should address
the issue of TI and how to effectively manage the "investment decision."
6. DOD needs to implement an agency-wide pilot test to collect data and
measure the effectiveness of NDI procurements.
As mentioned before, DOD has no agency-wide information system that
provides any meaningful data to measure the effectiveness of NDI procurements. On a
larger scale, each Service component could perform a similar data collection and
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assessment effort done by the researcher (Appendix F). The researcher's criteria were
effective in providing meaningful assessments on possible Army NDI procurement trends.
The Army is concentrating procurement efforts on items "not yet available" in the
commercial marketplace. In addition, the need for greater systems integration is
increasing (Appendix F). The underlying issue is whether such focuses are escalating
developmental costs to the point of diminishing returns.
7. DOD should propose an amendment to the FAR Subpart 14.202-4 which
would permit a bidder's sample to be used in determining a bidder's
ability to produce the required item.
Two-step sealed bidding cannot really assess risk, or the likelihood of
successful performance like that of a best-value approach. Two-step uses bid samples
to determine "responsiveness." As a product-like qualification measure, the physical
demonstration of the product, in part, indicates the likelihood of successful performance.
The overall effect reduces risk concerns about the contractor's ability to procure the item;
however, the Government cannot use bid samples to evaluate a bidder's ability to
produce the required item. It is difficult to evaluate only "responsiveness" when the
Government has a sample that could also function as a physical demonstration of the
bidder's ability to produce the item. It is in the Government's interest to have the
flexibility to make a reasonable determination on both matters when acquiring
nondevelopmental items. In effect, a waiver process could be established so that the
Government could make such a determination when it is feasible and specified up-front
in the solicitation. As suggested, a simple categorical rating could be used.
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8. DOD should request that Congress enact a statutory provision in the NDI
Preference Act to authorize only DOD to use "supplier" prequalification
in both sealed bid and competitive proposal procurements for the sole
purpose of acquiring NDI products.
Unlike best-value contracting, two-step is not authorized to use a supplier
prequalification process. The Packard Commission recommended enactment of a
statutory provision in the 1987 NDI Preference Act that would authorize DOD to
implement a supplier prequalification requirement as part of the comprehensive
commercial procurement system mandated by law. The goal is to implement carefully
a "Qualified Bidders List" for sole use in NDI acquisitions. It simply precludes poor
quality contractors from bidding unless acceptability could be determined beforehand.
In this manner, the statutory provision enhances the acquisition of nondevelopmental
items without changing the legislative scope of CICA.
9. DOD should propose an amendment to the FAR 14.502 (a) (5) which
would allow a two-step method to use a fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF)
contract.
The use of an FPAF contract could be extremely beneficial in improving a
two-step procurement method. It is a value-based contracting technique that offers
unique opportunities for the Government not only to get the type of contractor wanted
but also the type of performance really desired. This contract type would require a FAR
amendment or deviation. Because an FPAF contract is not explicitly prohibited from
use, it is possible that a FAR deviation could be granted. As noted, a request for a FAR
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deviation is a useful way to develop and test new techniques or methods. The Air Force
has already developed and tested an FPAF contract.
A FPAF contract appears suitable for two-step NDI procurements. An award-fee
contract provides for a contractor to perform on a fixed-price basis with "award" of a
variable "fee" to be determined at the sole direction of an award determination board in
response to the quality of work performed. The award fee is based on a judgmental
evaluation by the Government. The key is to ensure that the evaluation factors are
critical and sufficient to motivate contractor performance. In essence, an FPAF contract
could greatly improve the integration of best value in two-step.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question: To what extent can the Department of
Defense use two-step sealed bidding for getting best value in
nondevelopmental items?
Two-step is a viable procurement method for expanding the role of best value
and NDI acquisitions. Like best-value contracting, two-step can foster a value-based
approach. Although two-step lacks the judgmental flexibility of best-value contracting,
it does have a value-based procurement decision. Furthermore, a two-step method can
strengthen the verifiability of the source selection process. Two-step reduces the
intangibles or judgmental areas by quantifying them using life-cycle costing. A two-step
process can balance price and value in a manner that does not complicate the process.
The key is to use life-cycle costing. LCC is a measure of value and an essential aspect
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of best-value contracting. As Deming described, LCC ends "the practice of awarding
business on the basis of price tag only" [Ref. 23: p. 53].
Life-cycle cost can enable the Government to take advantage of a proposal
with design features exceeding the essential requirements because the bidder's total cost
of ownership might be further reduced as a result of having these additional features.
In addition, LCC eliminates the need for a price differential factor because the
Government can achieve greater cost savings in terms of long-term worth. Two-step is
not being fully exploited. Two-step can capitalize on life-cycle costing and other value-
based techniques to derive a value-based procurement decision in which the outcome is
most beneficial to the Government in terms of achieving greater long-term worth. Two-
step has fallen into disuse because of the popularity of best-value contracting; however,
it is a viable tool for acquiring nondevelopmental items in a cost-beneficial manner.
Two-step has many advantages in comparison to a conventional RFP best-value approach.
Two-step is best suited for nondevelopmental items that are "off-the-shelf and those
requiring "minor modification." DOD can use two-step as a viable "net-value"
alternative for getting best value in NDI acquisitions.
2. Subsidiary Question 1: What are the essential characteristics of best-
value contracting?
The following features characterize the best-value acquisition process:
• past performance history
• life-cycle costing
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• contractor's ability to successfully manage risk
« supportability
• reliability and maintainability of the product
• certification of contractors as preferred suppliers
• inclusion of a price differential factor in source selections for high quality products.
A best-value decision is based on assessing long-term worth instead of the initial
acquisition price. Best-value contracting is an integrated process and not a one-time
event. The requirements definition is an integral, but sometimes overlooked, step in the
best-value process. The evaluation factors are the backbone of the source selection
process. The evaluation criteria must be properly identified and appropriately weighted.
Evaluation criteria are uniquely tailored to each procurement. Typical criteria include
quality-related factors such as reliability and maintainability. The award decision is
based upon a tradeoff assessment when considering price and performance differentials
between competing offers. The resulting value judgment must be rational, and the
thought process consistent to withstand any protest.
3. Subsidiary Question 2: What is a nondevelopmental item acquisition?
NDI represents a philosophical shift in requirements planning and material
development. It covers a spectrum of commercially available alternatives, ranging from
those items purely "off-the-shelf to developmental items with NDI subsystems and/or
components (Appendix B). The underlying purpose of an NDI acquisition is to minimize
or eliminate the need for costly, time-consuming, Government-sponsored research and
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development programs. Most respondents felt that "true" nondevelopmental items were
commercial products that were "off-the-shelf" or "already in use." The objective of
"nondevelopmental" is to acquire commercial alternatives "not requiring development."
This does not preclude the possible requirement of Government-funded development.
The following summary best captures the true intent of "nondevelopmental:"
When conducted correctly, an NDI should result in the Government's selection of
an existing item which, by either evaluation or testing, demonstrates the potential
to meet the user's optimum requirement with a minimum of subsequent
development, cost, schedule, or technical risk.
4. Subsidiary Question 3: What features of the two-step process are
inherently best-value characteristics?
Though functionally different, two-step has an inherent form of best value.
The following features summarize this functionally different but inherent form of best
value:
• life-cycle costing
• quality-based evaluation factors
• compliant bid samples.
These features function in a conventional two-step process. Each aspect adds
value to the award decision process. The heart of this inherent form of best value is life-
cycle costing. A best-value methodology focuses on minimizing life-cycle costs. Cost
of ownership is related to best value. LCC is an integral aspect of best-value
contracting. It is a measure of long-term worth that is also an inherent form of best
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value. Two-step has an inherent form of best value--life-cycle cost. Two-step substitutes
life-cycle cost for price as the decision criterion. The criterion for contract award is no
longer price. In this manner, two-step allows a pre-stated, non-price factor to influence
the source selection. LCC results in a procurement award decision that is "most
beneficial" to the Government in terms of offering the lowest estimated total cost of
ownership.
The second feature is using quality-based evaluation factors in a two-step
process. Best-value contracting emphasizes reliability and maintainability. Likewise,
these factors are just as important in the technical evaluation of two-step. These
evaluation factors are quality-related considerations. Technical acceptability is based on
"conformity" to the requirements. Conformity is, in part, a function of quality which
adds value to the overall two-step process. The notion of "prequalification" is different
in two-step than in best-value contracting. The first step acts like a "filtering out
process," which eliminates unqualified offerors from the second step.
The final aspect is the value added from using bid samples. Best-value
contracting measures the likelihood of successful performance or risk. Under a two-step
method, bid samples help to better gauge the likelihood of successful performance. A
bid sample is similar to a product-like qualification measure. The physical demonstration
of the sample can, in part, indicate the likelihood of successful performance. In other
words, the physical demonstration reduces risk concerns about a contractor's ability to
produce the item even though its primary function is to determine responsiveness. These
aspects highlight the inherent characteristics of best value.
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5. Subsidiary Question 4: What are the key impediments in two-step sealed
bidding that preclude the use of best value?
Three significant shortfalls exist in two-step sealed bidding:
• the evaluation and use of past performance
• certification of contractors as preferred suppliers
• inclusion of a price differential factor in source selections for high quality products.
Two-step can only evaluate past performance as a function of a responsibility
determination, while best-value contracting can use past performance as a non-price
evaluation factor for determining the award of a contract. In FAR Subpart 9. 104-1, the
regulatory language conflicts with the concept of giving a preference to suppliers based
on superior performance. Two-step cannot award a contract to a higher priced offeror
or consider differences in prices based on quality differentiation. Ultimately, the award
basis is limited to the lowest priced offeror. The award decision is restricted only to
"price and price-related factors". Finally, two-step cannot evaluate requirements that
exceed the minimum standards of acceptability.
6. Subsidiary Question 5: How can a two-step method be improved to
facilitate its joint use with best value and NDI procurements?
Three regulatory changes can enhance a two-step process in better using best
value. First, the present use of bid samples is too restrictive. A bid sample determines
"responsiveness" and not the bidder's ability to produce the required item. However,
the bidder's ability to produce the required item is really inseparable from a
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determination of responsiveness. The FAR should be amended to reflect a waiver
process that allows a bidder's ability to produce the required item to be considered with
the determination of responsiveness. In doing so, the "total" physical demonstration will
likely facilitate the assessment of risk and better indicate the likelihood of successful
performance while not undermining the concept of responsibility.
Next, two-step does not authorize the use of a "supplier" prequalification
program. The Packard Commission encouraged such a program in all procurement
methods to facilitate quality performance. The Commission recommended the enactment
of a statutory provision in the 1987 NDI Preference Act that would authorize DOD to
implement a supplier prequalification requirement as part of the comprehensive
commercial procurement system mandated by law. The goal is to implement carefully
a "Qualified Bidders List" for sole use in NDI acquisitions. In this way, the statutory
provision enhances the acquisition of nondevelopmental items and two-step without
changing the legislative scope of CICA.
Finally, two-step does not permit the use of a fixed-price-award-fee (FPAF)
contract. A FPAF contract could be extremely beneficial in improving a two-step
procurement method. The FAR should be amended or a deviation granted for its use.
It is a value-based contracting technique that offers unique opportunities and greater
flexibility for the Government. The award fee is based on a judgmental evaluation by
the Government. The key is to ensure that the evaluation factors are critical and
sufficient to motivate contractor performance. This type of contract is suitable for two-
step NDI procurements.
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E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Develop a DOD-wide implementation handbook on how to use and
measure effectively best value.
2. Validate the alternative form of best value and present a detailed analysis
of potential procurement situations in which this alternative form of best
value is more advantageous than a conventional best-value process.
3. Develop a suitable methodology for an information system to collect
meaningful data for purposes of assessing the effectiveness, uses, and
trends of NDI procurements. Validate the researcher's strategy plan
with a larger sample of NDI acquisitions.
4. Identify the different "price-related" factors that can effectively expand
the role of price-only awards while ending the practice of awarding
business on the basis of price tag only.
5. Investigate how to improve the responsibility determination process so
that an adequate assessment of risk, or the likelihood of successful
performance can be measured in price-only contract awards.
6. Develop a return-on-investment (ROD factor to be used in a two-step
process so that the Government has the flexibility to give an evaluation
preference (e.g. 10%) to a bidder for having a particular "technology
enhancement" that provides long-term LCC savings to the Government.
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APPENDIX A: NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM DEFINITION
1. United States Code, Title 10, Section § 2325 "Preference for nondevelopmental
items"
(a) PREFERENCE. --The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that, to the maximum
extent practicable—
(1) requirements of the Department of Defense with response to a
procurement of supplies are stated in terms of—
(A) functions to be performed;
(B) performance required; or
(C) essential physical characteristics;
(2) such requirements are defined so that nondevelopmental items may be
procured to fulfill such requirements; and
(3) such requirements are fulfilled through the procurement of
nondevelopmental items.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION. -The Secretary of Defense shall carry out this section
through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, who shall have responsibility
for its effective implementation.
(c) REGULATIONS. -The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to
carry out this section.
(d) DEFINITION. -In this section, the term "nondevelopmental item" means—
(1) any item of supply that is available in the commercial marketplace;
(2) any previously-developed item of supply that is in use by a department
or agency of the United States, a State or local government, or a foreign
government with which the United States has a mutual defense cooperation
agreement;
(3) any item of supply described in paragraph (1) or (2) that requires only
minor modification in order to meet the requirements of the procuring agency; or
(4) any item of supply that is currently being produced that does not meet
the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3) solely because the item-
(A) is not yet in use; or
(B) is not yet available in the commercial marketplace.
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Source: [Ref. 15: p. 2-3].
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APPENDIX C: BEST-VALUE CONTRACTING DEFINITIONS
1. Any basis for award that states factors in addition to cost/price will be considered
in some relative order of importance to determine the winning proposal [Ref. 51:
p. 1].
2. Select the source whose proposal has the highest degree of credibility, and whose
performance can be expected to best meet the Government's requirement at an
affordable cost. Note that lowest cost is not the overall driving factor for award.
The source selection authority is able to balance technical, financial, and
economic or business considerations in making an objective and equitable
contractor selection. The final result is a qualified contractor who performs well
and who provides the best overall value to the Government [Ref. 42: p. 16].
3. That system that gives the government agency the ability to evaluate all aspects
of the proposed work—price, quality, time of delivery, and competence of the
offeror to perform, and to select the offer that promises the best value to the
Government [Ref. 33: p. 1],
4. A source selection in which the Government is not committed to award to the
lowest-price acceptable offer, but reserves the right to select the source whose
proposal offers the greatest value to the Government in terms of performance and
other factors [Ref. 53: p. 2].
5. To provide a quantifiable determination of contractor delivery and quality
performance for inclusion into the award process in conjunction with price to
achieve best value for the Government [Ref. 50: p. 2].
6. A "best value" is the Government's most advantageous acquisition decision as
determined through an integrated assessment of lowest overall cost based on a
disciplined and comprehensive evaluation of offers against all requirements
specified in the solicitation [Ref. 49: p. 3].
7. The evaluation of a (commercial) product, system of service based on all
reasonable factors including but not limited to initial price, life cycle costs,
available extended warranties, prior product experience, availability of
distribution and service channels, past performance and so forth, for the purpose
of producing a product, system, or service that provides optimum satisfaction of
the mission needs [Ref. 4: p. 5].
126
APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
A. GENERAL
The following questions attempt to address the issues in determining the feasibility
of using two-step sealed bidding for getting "best value" in an NDI procurement.
B. QUESTIONS
1. How would you define best-value contracting as a procurement concept?
2. How would you define the concept of nondevelopment item acquisition?
3. To what extent can the concept of best value be used in two-step sealed bidding?
4. To what extent do we use two-step sealed bidding in nondevelopmental items?
Are there any threads or traces of best value?
5. To what degree do you think that best-value contracting and two-step sealed
bidding are directly in conflict?
6. In using two-step sealed bidding, does the requirement of "minimum
acceptability" restrict the Government's ability to choose the best "technically
qualified" offeror in purchasing "nondevelopmental items"?
7. To what extent can two-step sealed bidding result in the procurement of
nondevelopmental items which are not the best, in terms of quality, because
award of the contract is based on the lowest priced offeror that meets the
Government's minimum requirements?
8. Are there any advantages to purchasing a more desirable (technically superior)
nondevelopmental item at a very slightly higher bid price?
9. Could the acquisition of nondevelopmental items be improved; if there is a
procurement method that encompasses the principles of best value and two-step
sealed bidding?
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10. Could it be beneficial to award a contract without negotiations while considering
price and quality-related factors?
11. Could it be better to use a "band of performance" concept which identifies a
minimum level of performance required, and a maximum or limit on how far the
Government wants the offeror to exceed the specified minimum? In doing so,
would the "band" concept best serve the Government in deriving the "best price"
or "best buy"?
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APPENDIX E: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
The following list of names are individuals who participated directly in the interviews
conducted.
1. Asch, Larry. Contracting Officer. U.S. Army Communications and Electronics
Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 27 August 1992.
2. Carroll, Tom. Legal Counsel. U.S. Army Communications and Electronics
Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 16 August 1992.
3. Colangelo, Thomas W. Army Policy Representative to the Defense Acquisition
Regulatory Council. Washington, DC. 25 September 1992.
4. Duerinck, Phil. Procurement Branch Chief. U.S. Army Communications and
Electronics Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 28 August 1992.
5. Felt, Patricia. U.S. Army Product Manager Office for Mortar Systems.
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. 10 October 1992.
6. Gantt, Silven C. Major (USA). Procurement Officer. U.S. Army Materiel
Command (Acquisition Policy Division). Alexandria, VA. 23 September
1992.
7. Gaudio, Lou. Procurement Analyst. Office of the Director for Defense
Procurement. Washington, DC. 25 September 1992.
8. Gordon, Harvey J. Director of Government Business Relations. Martin Marietta
Corporation. Bethesda, MD. 25 September 1992.
9. Hackett, Robert D. Director. Contract Policies Procurement and Finance.
Aerospace Industries Association. Washington, DC. 22 September 1992.
10. John, Bill. Director of Contracting. Department of the Navy. Naval Air
Systems Command. Washington, DC. 24 September 1992.
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11. Keogh, John. Systems Analyst. U.S. Army Project Manager Office for Mobile
Subscriber Equipment. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 27 August 1992.
12. Korte, Edward. General Counsel. U.S. Army Materiel Command. Alexandria,
VA. 25 September 1992.
13. Linke, Silvia. Performance Risk Assessment Group. U.S. Army Materiel
Command (Procurement Management Division). Alexandria, VA. 23
September 1992.
14. Love, Kathleen T. Procurement Analyst. U.S. Army Material Command
(Procurement Policy Division). Alexandria, VA. 23 September 1992.
15. Maryanski, Dick. Deputy Project Manager. U.S. Army Project Manager Office
for TMDE. Redstone Arsenal, AL. 6 September 1992.
16. McKamey, Verne. Procurement Analyst. Office of the Director for Defense
Procurement. Washington, DC. 24 September 1992.
17. McKenna, G. Warren. Policy Compliance. U.S. Army Communications and
Electronics Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 27 August 1992.
18. Michlik, Martin J. Colonel (USA). Project Manager. U.S. Army Project
Manager Office for Night Vision Electro Optical Devices. Ft. Belvoir, VA.
27 September 1992.
19. Onieal, John. Policy Compliance. U.S. Army Communications and Electronics
Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 27 August 1992.
20. Piad, Carlos A. Deputy NDI Advocate. U.S. Army Materiel Command.
Alexandria, VA. 23 September 1992.
21. Reiley, Mike. U.S. Army Materiel Command (Procurement Management
Division). Alexandria, VA. 23 September 1992.
22. Reinhard, Manfred J. Deputy Director for Defense Systems Procurement
Strategies. Washington, DC. 24 September 1992.
23. Robertson, Jack. Contracting Officer. U.S. Army Communications and
Electronics Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 27 August 1992.
24. Scott, Shelley. U.S. Army Materiel Command (Procurement Management
Division). Alexandria, VA. 23 September 1992.
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25. Summers, Wilson. Contract Management Department Chairman. Defense
Systems Management College. Ft. Belvoir, VA. 22 September 1992.
26. Super, David. Procurement Analyst. U.S. Army Product Manager Office for
Mortar Systems. Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. 1 October 1992.
27. Troxel, David. Systems Engineer. U.S. Army Project Manager Office for Night
Vision Electro Optical Devices. Ft. Belvoir, VA. 22 September 1992.
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APPENDIX F: RESULTS OF AN NDI ACQUISITION SURVEY
A. GENERAL
The information collected represents a small sample (27/195) of nondevelopmental
items tracked by the Acquisition Management Milestone System (AMMS). The
nondevelopmental items selected for this survey represent a cross-section of products
from all the major subordinate commands within the U.S. Army Materiel Command.
A telephone survey was conducted. The questions asked and results are tabulated below.
B. SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. What method of procurement is used (competitive or noncompetitive
basis?
a. Sealed bidding.
b. Two-step sealed bidding.
c. Competitive proposal.
2. How would you classify the NDI acquisition as it relates to the Title 10
definition?
a. Commercially Available (Off-the Shelf).
b. Already Developed (Foreign or Domestic).
c. Minor Modification.
d. Not Yet Available (Integration).














2. Machine Gun (40mm) MK19 Two-Step Sealed Bidding Already Developed
by Navy
NO
3. M24 Sniper Weapon Competitive Proposal
(Competitive)
Minor Modification NO















7. AN/ARN-157 Omega Navigational System Two-Step Sealed Bidding
(Competitive)
Minor Modification NO















11. VDR-2 Radiac Set Sealed Bidding
(Noncompetitive)
Minor Modification NO
12. Elec. Filmless Camera B Competitive Proposal
(Competitive)
Minor Modification YES
13. Fire Support System Dual (FSSD) Competitive Proposal
(Competitive)
Minor Modification YES












16. Roller, Mine Clearing Sealed Bidding
Competitive)
Minor Modification NO
17. MOST (Snowmobile) Competitive Proposal
(Competitive)
Minor Modification YES










































25. RTCC, Rough Terrain Crane Wheel Competitive Proposal
(Competitive)
Minor Modification NO
26. Landing craft, utility (LCU) Competitive Proposal
(Competitive)
Minor Modification YES





SOURCE: Developed By Researcher
D. DATA SUMMARY





SOURCE: Developed By Researcher
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2. Method of Procurement
PROCEDURES NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Sealed Bidding 2/27 .07
Competitive Proposal 17/27 .63
Two-Step Sealed Bidding 4/27 .15
Sole Source 4/27 .15
TOTAL 27/27 100.0
SOURCE: Developed By Researcher
3. NDI Classification (Nature of Use)
CLASSIFICATION NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Commercially Available 2/27 .08
Already Developed—Foreign 3/27 .11
Already Developed—Domestic 1/27 .04
Minor Modification 9/27 .33
Not Yet Available 12/27 .44
TOTAL 27/27 100.0
SOURCE: Developed By Researcher





SOURCE: Developed By Researcher
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APPENDIX G: THE RESEARCH MODEL
A. GENERAL
The objective of this research is to determine the feasibility of using two-step sealed bidding for
getting best value in NDI procurements. The following Venn Diagram model provides a framework for
examining the researcher's inquiry into this matter.
Shaded Area Represents
Overlapping Ideas of Methods
$*
Source: Developed By Researcher
B. DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT
The Venn Diagram above is based on the following syllogism or deductive argument in which a
conclusion is inferred from two premises.
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1. Description of Proposed Argument:
Premise: A nondevelopmental item acquisition can use the concept of best value.
Premise: Some NDI acquisitions use two-step sealed bidding.
Conclusion: Therefore, two-step sealed bidding can use the concept of best value.
2. Schematic Flow of Argument:
*N - B*
N - T*
.*. T - B
Note: .". -- Symbol denotes "therefore"
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